The Math Behind Career and Life Success

Abstract

This whitepaper presents a conceptual framework for career and life success: Success = (Desire − Fear)^Luck, where Luck = (Relationships × Timing). While individual effort and talent provide the foundation, outcomes frequently amplify through net conviction and engineered serendipity. Academic studies, including Pluchino et al. (2018) simulations showing luck’s dominance in extreme success, Mauboussin (2012) on the skill-luck continuum, and Sinatra et al. (2020) quantifying randomness in creative careers, substantiate this perspective. Case studies of Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, and Oprah Winfrey demonstrate the equation’s components in action. Implications for professionals emphasize managing controllable factors while positioning for fortunate alignments.

Success = (Desire − Fear) ^ (Relationships × Timing)

Introduction

Career trajectories and life fulfillment are often ascribed to talent or perseverance alone, yet substantial variance remains unexplained. Prominent figures frequently acknowledge circumstantial advantages—Bill Gates, for instance, credits access to early computers and supportive networks (Gladwell, 2008). This paper articulates Success = (Desire − Fear)^Luck, with Luck = Relationships × Timing.

Desire embodies sustained drive toward meaningful goals. Fear manifests as hesitation, risk aversion, or self-doubt. A positive base sustains pursuit amid setbacks. Luck compounds this: relationships foster opportunities and mentorship; timing aligns personal readiness with external shifts. This aligns with empirical models where moderately talented individuals with favorable events outperform pure talent (Pluchino et al., 2018).

Deconstructing the Base: Desire Minus Fear

Desire fuels persistent effort: fear erodes it through doubt or loss aversion. Sustaining desire over fear creates resilience essential for long-term achievement.

Jeff Bezos exemplified this during Amazon’s founding. In 1994, secure in a Wall Street vice presidency, Bezos identified internet growth potential (2300% annual web usage increase). Despite fears of abandoning stability, his desire for entrepreneurial impact prevailed. He drove cross-country to launch an online bookstore, maintaining conviction through early losses exceeding $1 billion cumulatively by 2000 (Brandt, 2011).

Oprah Winfrey similarly overcame fear. Early career instability and personal trauma could have deterred ambition, yet desire for authentic connection propelled her. Transitioning from local news to hosting, she persisted despite initial ratings struggles, building a media empire through relentless focus on empathy-driven content.

The Exponent: Luck as Relationships × Timing

Luck elevates the base exponentially. Relationships provide access and support; timing synchronizes effort with opportunity.

Bill Gates benefited profoundly. Born 1955, he accessed computers rare for teenagers—Lakeside School’s terminal in 1968 enabled thousands of programming hours (Gladwell, 2008). Relationship with Paul Allen led to co-founding Microsoft; timing aligned with 1975 Altair microcomputer release, prompting BASIC interpreter development. IBM’s 1980 PC deal—secured partly through familial connections—catapulted Microsoft (Isaacson, 2014).

Bezos timed the 1990s internet boom perfectly, launching Amazon amid deregulation and connectivity growth. Early investor relationships sustained operations during dot-com volatility.

Winfrey’s breakthrough involved timing and relationships. Hired in television post-1970s affirmative action shifts, she met Quincy Jones, who cast her in The Color Purple (1985), earning an Oscar nomination and elevating her profile (Academy of Achievement interviews).

Empirical Insights from Research

Simulations reveal luck’s outsized role. Pluchino et al. (2018) modeled normally distributed talent with random events; luckiest moderately talented agents dominated success distributions. Mauboussin (2012) positions creative professions nearer luck than skill-dominant fields. Sinatra et al. (2020) found consistent randomness influence across careers, with timing of peak impacts unpredictable.

These cases reflect transience: Gates post-Microsoft shifted to philanthropy; Bezos stepped down as CEO in 2021; Winfrey ended her daily show in 2011, pivoting successfully.

Implications for Professionals

Individuals control desire through goal clarity and fear via exposure and reflection. Engineering luck entails deliberate networking and adaptability to trends.

Conclusion

The framework Success = (Desire − Fear)^Luck illuminates why similar talents yield divergent outcomes. Skill and effort construct the base, yet luck—through relational networks and temporal alignments—often determines magnitude. Pluchino et al. (2018) demonstrate that without fortunate events, even high talent plateaus; conversely, moderate talent amplified by luck reaches extremes.

This underscores humility: acknowledging luck tempers overconfidence in meritocracy, fostering gratitude and resilience. Gates, Bezos, and Winfrey each credit preparation meeting opportunity, yet external factors—birth era, access, connections—proved pivotal.

For professionals, implications are profound. Prioritize desire by aligning pursuits with intrinsic motivations; mitigate fear through incremental risks and support systems. Cultivate relationships broadly, as serendipitous ties often unlock doors. Monitor timing by staying informed on industry shifts, positioning for emerging waves.

Ultimately, while luck remains partially uncontrollable, maximizing return on it—through readiness and action—distinguishes sustained success. This balanced view encourages persistent effort without disillusionment, recognizing life’s compound nature where conviction, amplified by engineered fortune, yields fulfillment beyond mere achievement.

Bibliography

  • Brandt, R. L. (2011). One Click: Jeff Bezos and the Rise of Amazon.com. Portfolio/Penguin.
  • Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2010). Luck versus skill in the cross-section of mutual fund returns. The Journal of Finance, 65(5), 1915–1947.
  • Gladwell, M. (2008). Outliers: The Story of Success. Little, Brown and Company.
  • Isaacson, W. (2014). The Innovators: How a Group of Hackers, Geniuses, and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution. Simon & Schuster.
  • Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
  • Lewis, M. (2010). The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. W.W. Norton & Company.
  • Mauboussin, M. J. (2012). The Success Equation: Untangling Skill and Luck in Business, Sports, and Investing. Harvard Business Review Press.
  • Pluchino, A., Biondo, A. E., & Rapisarda, A. (2018). Talent versus luck: The role of randomness in success and failure. Advances in Complex Systems, 21(03n04), 1850014.
  • Schroeder, A. (2008). The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life. Bantam Books.
  • Sinatra, R., Wang, D., Deville, P., Song, C., & Barabási, A.-L. (2020). Quantifying the evolution of individual scientific impact. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(45), 27856–27863. (Note: Earlier citation referenced related work on randomness in careers.)
  • Zuckerman, G. (2010). The Greatest Trade Ever: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of How John Paulson Defied Wall Street and Made Financial History. Broadway Books.
  • Zuckerman, G. (2019). The Man Who Solved the Market: How Jim Simons Launched the Quant Revolution. Portfolio/Penguin.

About the Author

Marc J. Sharpe is a global investment executive and board member with a distinguished career spanning family office management, private equity, venture capital, and investment banking. Known for his strategic insight, deep expertise in family office governance, and ability to foster innovation and value creation, Mr. Sharpe has built and led investment platforms that deliver sustainable growth while navigating complex financial and operational challenges. His leadership style emphasizes integrity, continuous improvement, and long-term partnerships that generate significant stakeholder value. Mr. Sharpe is the Founder and Chairman of The Family Office Association, a premier global peer network of single-family offices. Since 2007, he has cultivated a community of senior family office executives and principals representing some of the world’s wealthiest families, promoting education, shared-best practices, and co-investment opportunities. Under his leadership, TFOA has become a trusted forum for collaboration, market insight, and proprietary investment deal flow on a global scale. He also teaches an MBA class on “The Entrepreneurial Family Office” as an Adjunct Professor at Rice University and Southern Methodist University. Mr. Sharpe holds an M.A. from Cambridge University, an M.Phil. from Oxford University, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members, and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families: www.tfoa.info

Disclosures

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a peer network of single family offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All of the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

Family Office Dynamics When Wealth Meets Strategy

Executive Summary

Family offices operate at the intersection of wealth, governance, and legacy. In this environment, negotiation is not a discrete skill but an operating system—a disciplined, repeatable approach to decisions with generational consequences. Traditional, consensus-first models can falter when confronted with entrenched histories, power asymmetries, and identity-driven differences, leading to delays, vague compromises, or short-term harmony at the expense of long-term misery.

This whitepaper presents a structured negotiation framework tailored to single- and multi-family offices. Drawing on principles from high-stakes negotiation practice, it offers preparation methods, process design, and leadership behaviors that can transform friction into clarity. Here we map the negotiation landscape within family offices, explain why common approaches often underperform, and provide a practical playbook with real-world examples.

We also integrate insights from the broader literature and practice community. While formal research specific to family offices remains nascent, there is accumulating knowledge from family business governance and professional practice that illuminates how families negotiate complex, emotionally charged decisions. We synthesize these insights within a single narrative so leaders can apply them— thereby preserving relationships while achieving durable, strategic outcomes.

Introduction

Decisions within a family office often ripple across generations, shape governance standards, influence cohesion, and become part of a family’s story and legacy. While some family offices may only resemble sophisticated investment organizations, the context in which they negotiate is distinct: outcomes are rarely ‘just financial’ and frequently entail personal, reputational, and multi-generational dimensions.

This magnifies the stakes and complicates the process. Negotiation must balance measurable outcomes with deeply human considerations—recognition, fairness, dignity, and control being just a few among them. Decisions stretch well beyond quarterly horizons and determine stewardship models, intergenerational transitions, and how a family’s values are presented over time.

Therefore, the practical question is how families can make high‑quality decisions, with diverse stakeholders, often under considerable pressure, and in environments where multiple ‘right answers’ may exist. The structured approach outlined here offers a disciplined path that holds complexity without defaulting to avoidance or superficial agreement.

Understanding the Family Office Negotiation Landscape

Family offices vary widely in mandate, scale, and governance structure. Some solely emphasize investments and risk management; others integrate a much broader set of activities, including estate planning, philanthropy, lifestyle management, education for next‑generation members, and the stewardship of family identity. All must align decision‑making across personal, financial, and legacy priorities.

At a practical level, this dual role—financial stewardship alongside personal and legacy stewardship—creates a negotiation environment that is uniquely complex. Money intersects with meaning. Structures designed for efficiency must coexist with relationships defined by history. Formal decision rights meet informal influence. In this context, negotiation is a strategic leadership function rather than a series of one‑off tactics.

Stakeholders and Incentives

Stakeholders encompass family principals and wealth creators, next‑generation members, non‑family executives, trustees and fiduciaries, investment committees and advisory boards, operating company leadership, and a constellation of external professionals such as asset managers, wealth advisors, bankers, lawyers, tax advisors, auditors, and technology providers. Each brings distinct incentives, authority levels, and communication norms. Effective negotiation requires fluency across these differences. Soft skills matter as much as technical acumen: the capacity to listen, to separate substance from emotion, and to structure conversations so difficult topics can be addressed constructively is essential.

Common Negotiation Arenas

Negotiations in family offices occur routinely and often out of public view. Internally, leadership addresses compensation, budgeting, resource allocation, investment mandates, governance design, and succession or hiring decisions. Within the family, discussions span distribution and liquidity policies, ownership transitions, next‑generation roles and readiness, oversight of operating companies, philanthropic vision, and alignment of investment philosophy across generations. Externally, offices negotiate direct investment terms, manager selection and economics, co‑investment agreements, vendor and technology contracts, real estate transactions, and dispute resolution. Despite their variety, these negotiations share two characteristics: deeply human dynamics and typically long time horizons. Decisions are not only about price or terms; they concern identity, recognition, fairness, and the preservation of relationships that must endure well beyond a single transaction.

Why Traditional Approaches Often Fall Short

Consensus-first models and techniques focused primarily on mutual gains may have value in less difficult negotiations but can be insufficient in family offices where emotional history, ambiguous mandates, and asymmetric power interact. The desire to preserve harmony can lead to the avoidance of difficult topics, reliance on vague compromises, or decisions that placate in the short term but undermine long‑term strategy. Family office decisions frequently present multiple valid pathways. When there is no single ‘correct’ answer, attempts to force consensus can produce unstable outcomes. A structured approach addresses this by focusing on process clarity, disciplined preparation, assembling the optimal negotiation team, and deliberate choices among several acceptable end states—including agreement, deadlock, escalation, or non‑agreement when integrity requires it.

Principles from High‑Stakes Negotiation Practice

Negotiation methods developed for high‑pressure environments translate directly to family offices. They emphasize planning, behavioral awareness, and clarity under pressure. Four components are particularly useful: preparation, opening, leadership, and closing (the Schranner Concept®). The mindset advised in difficult situations is one of positivity with courage and the willingness to “play to win”. Splitting differences and seeking win-wins is not recommended, as such outcomes risk causing resentment or failures after the negotiation. Rather, applying a focus on embracing the conflict early on, clearly and with confidence, can better ensure long-term success once the parties have left the table.

1. Preparation: Map Interests, Behaviors, and Constraints

Preparation anchors effective negotiation. In a family office, it requires an expanded lens that accounts for personal, financial, and legacy interests; behavioral tendencies; decision rights and governance boundaries; emotional context; timing pressures; and internal alignment or misalignment. Preparation should culminate in a ‘demand list’—a structured articulation of what must be achieved, what is desirable, and what is unacceptable. Unlike a wish list, the demand list guides disciplined decision‑making and ensures that concessions and escalation pathways are planned rather than improvised.

2. Opening: Establish Structure, Roles, and Boundaries

The opening phase sets tone and process. Before substance is discussed, the parties should align on the agenda, roles, decision rights, and how the discussion will unfold. In family office contexts, where relationships run deep and emotions may be close to the surface, separating personal connection from negotiation time is essential. Compiling the strongest team is critical, as is identifying clear roles for each team member. In this context, the FBI model can be extremely helpful:

  • Decision Maker – not present at the negotiation but holding authority

  • Commander – observant, mostly silent, looking at the big picture

  • Negotiator – with the license to negotiate, active in the negotiation

  • Expert – mostly available on the sidelines for additional information and guidance

Explicit process agreements—what is in scope, how decisions will be recorded, when breaks will occur, how communication to each party’s internal teams will be handled—protect relationships and prevent unspoken expectations from derailing substance.

3. Leadership: Manage Friction, Emotion, and Complexity

In complex negotiations, friction is not an obstacle; it is a leadership responsibility. Process leaders maintain control, remain calm under pressure, and use friction strategically rather than avoiding it. Behavioral insight helps decode reactions and motivations. Deliberate pauses restore productivity when tension escalates. Neutral facilitation may be appropriate when role clarity is at risk. The aim is to channel conflict toward clarity and progress, not to eliminate it.

4. Closing: Choose Among Multiple Valid Outcomes

Closing does not always mean agreement. High‑quality outcomes include agreement (when interests align and commitments are clear), deadlock (a deliberate pause to gather information or recalibrate), escalation (used strategically when leverage needs to shift or additional authority is required), and non‑agreement (acceptable when it protects long‑term integrity). Recognizing the legitimacy of these outcomes reduces pressure to force consensus and prevents unstable or unclear decisions.

How Structured Negotiation Supports Family Office Goals

A structured process protects relationships without sacrificing clarity. Boundaries, agendas, and decision rights separate emotion from substance, enabling candid communication with minimal unintended harm. Durable decisions align personal, financial, and legacy interests. Structured negotiation brings these into the open rather than leaving them implicit, ensuring outcomes respect both quantitative goals and qualitative values.

Complexity can become an advantage. Tensions across generations, risk tolerances, and worldviews stimulate innovation when managed deliberately. Structured methods transform competing perspectives into productive friction that surfaces better options. Clear process design enhances governance and decision‑making efficiency. Agreements reached through disciplined negotiation are more likely to be actionable, auditable, and executable. And preparation and process control strengthen external positioning. Discipline reduces concession drift and maintains strategic focus with sophisticated counterparties.

A Practical Negotiation Playbook for Family Office Leaders

  1. Define the situation. Clarify the decision to be made, the stakeholders involved, relevant governance rules, timing constraints, and how the decision will be recorded.

  2. Identify the real conflict. Surface disagreements often mask deeper issues—fairness, identity, recognition, control, or legacy. Locating the real issue prevents repetitive debates over symptoms rather than causes.

  3. Develop the demand list. Document non‑negotiables, priorities, and unacceptable outcomes. Plan concessions and escalation paths in advance to protect against improvisation in high‑pressure moments.

  4. Build the strategy. Map potential concessions, anticipate emotional responses, define walk‑away points, and identify decision checkpoints. Consider which outcomes—agreement, deadlock, escalation, non‑agreement—would be acceptable under which conditions.

  5. Lead the negotiation. Maintain structure and role clarity. Separate emotion from process without dismissing it. Use friction constructively, and call deliberate pauses when tension is unproductive. Bring in neutral facilitation when appropriate.

  6. Close deliberately. Choose among the legitimate outcomes based on long‑term impact rather than short‑term comfort. Document commitments and follow‑up actions to ensure execution.

Negotiation in Practice: Real‑World Case Notes1

Case Note 1: Long‑Horizon Ownership Negotiation in Luxury Hospitality

Across more than two decades, the ownership of Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts illustrates how family offices negotiate complex control and governance questions in partnership with founders and strategic co‑owners. After taking the company private in 2007 with aligned partners and a court‑approved plan of arrangement, a Cascade Investment affiliate negotiated in 2021 to acquire a controlling stake at a US$10 billion enterprise value. The structure reaffirmed founder Isadore Sharp’s stake and preserved strategic direction—showcasing disciplined valuation framing, fairness processes, and governance continuity in sensitive control negotiations.

Case Note 2: Taking a Listed Group Private to Reduce Strategic Friction

In 2023, the Rothschild family’s holding company announced a simplified tender offer to take Rothschild & Co private at a premium to market, coupled with ordinary and exceptional distributions. Independent board oversight, financing coordination and AMF engagement—together with a consortium of long‑horizon families—illustrate structured negotiation that reconciles minority‑holder economics with legacy control and confidentiality.

Case Note 3: Defensive Negotiation and Family Unity at Hermès

When a competitor accumulated a significant stake in Hermès in 2010, the sixth‑generation family responded with an integrated defense—tightening ownership through a family holding vehicle and reframing the dispute as a cultural and governance question. The counter‑strategy emphasized unity, narrative clarity and legal process, preserving independence and highlighting how control structures and time locks can reweigh bargaining power.

Case Note 4: Co‑Investment Rights and Side‑Letter Negotiations

As family offices expand direct and co‑investing, negotiation shifts to deal architecture. Side‑letter terms—information and reporting rights, most‑favored‑nation access, tailored fees, governance roles and opt‑outs—can materially reshape economics and influence. With evolving private‑fund rules on preferential treatment, disciplined preparation and enforceable drafting are essential to align protections with primary agreements.

Case Note 5: Purpose Trusts and Philanthropy—Patagonia’s Transition

In 2022, Patagonia’s founder and family transferred all voting shares to a purpose trust and 98% of non‑voting shares to the Holdfast Collective, structuring all non‑reinvested profits for environmental aims. The multi‑entity design balances governance continuity (via a controlling purpose trust) with philanthropic deployment (via a social‑welfare entity), demonstrating how families can negotiate ownership, purpose and political constraints while protecting values and long‑term intent.

Case Note 6: Foundation‑Owned Governance—IKEA/INGKA Structure

To secure longevity and charitable impact, Ingvar Kamprad established an independent foundation‑owned structure in which INGKA Foundation owns Ingka Group and funds the IKEA Foundation. Family participation is capped within boards, and assets are reserved solely for charitable purpose. The model highlights negotiation of governance across generations: independence from private benefit, clarity of decision rights, and a funding pipeline that aligns enterprise performance with philanthropic commitments.

State of Research and Theory

Formal academic study of family offices remains nascent compared with the extensive literature on family‑owned operating companies. Much of what exists focuses on governance, succession, and socio‑emotional wealth in family firms rather than the negotiation mechanics of family offices.

Empirical work is constrained by the privacy of family offices and the difficulty of accessing data when conflicts and decision processes are largely confidential.

What we do know: conceptual work and practitioner insight converge on several points—family offices are distinct organizational forms; conflict arises predictably around control, fairness, and legacy; and structured processes reduce the likelihood that disagreements escalate or ossify. While negotiated outcomes are often specific to context, process quality consistently correlates with durability and relationship health.

Where the gaps remain: rigorous, comparative evidence on how family offices negotiate across issues such as asset allocation mandates, co‑investment governance, inter‑generational transitions, and philanthropic strategy is limited. Standardized frameworks that integrate power asymmetry, behavioral dynamics, and escalation design into practice are needed. This whitepaper contributes a practical synthesis aligned to those needs.

Examples of Structured Principles at Work

Succession planning often surfaces identity and legacy concerns alongside technical readiness. Structured preparation, including a shared demand list and explicit role definitions, creates clarity where emotion previously dominated. A staged transition plan with governance checkpoints can align expectations, protect continuity, and provide the next generation with meaningful responsibility well before formal handover.

Family and non‑family executive dynamics can suffer when decision rights and performance expectations are ambiguous. Controlled openings that separate personal connection from negotiation time, coupled with explicit mandates and measurable objectives, reduce pressure on both sides. When friction arises, neutral facilitation and deliberate pauses can re‑center the discussion on structure rather than personality.

Negotiating with external investment partners requires discipline commensurate with counterparty sophistication. Behavioral analysis of incentives—economics, reporting obligations, fundraising cycles—prevents concession drift. Pre‑planned escalation pathways, such as involving the investment committee or adjusting mandate scope, preserve leverage without jeopardizing long‑term relationships.

Aligning investment philosophy across generations demands a forum where risk tolerance and worldview differences can be translated into policy. By articulating shared objectives—return, resilience, and impact—and agreeing on governance mechanisms such as allocation bands, veto rights, and rebalancing rules, families can reconcile divergent preferences without eroding trust.

Distribution and liquidity policies bring fairness and recognition to the surface. A transparent framework that links policy to objectives—sustainability, education support, or entrepreneurial capital—reduces ad hoc concessions. Documented rules and review cadences build predictability while allowing for exceptional cases handled through defined processes.

Mini Case Study: Governance Tensions and Negotiation Leverage in a Family Office-Backed Growth Company2

Background

A Northern European growth company (“the Company”) had a fragmented ownership structure typical of family office–backed ventures. A family investment vehicle (“Family Office A”) held roughly one-third of the shares, alongside a strategic investment firm (“Investor B”), a large financial institution, and several smaller shareholders.

The Company’s CEO had close family ties to Family Office A, adding both trust and complexity to governance dynamics. Over several years, most shareholders supported injecting additional capital to accelerate expansion into new European markets. Investor B, however, favored a more conservative strategy focused on cost optimization rather than growth investment.

This strategic divergence led to prolonged board tensions lasting nearly three years, reflecting a common challenge in family-office ecosystems: balancing long-term entrepreneurial ambition with differing risk appetites among co-investors.

Negotiation Dynamics

In late 2025, Investor B approached a senior figure connected to Family Office A with an unsolicited offer to sell a significant minority stake at a premium valuation. The initial acceptance was considered on a private basis, outside a broader shareholder process.

Soon after, internal leadership within Family Office A raised governance concerns, arguing that the opportunity should be offered to all shareholders to ensure fairness and avoid potential conflicts of interest. This internal challenge prompted a reassessment of the transaction structure—highlighting how intra-family governance can be as decisive as external negotiation.

Negotiations intensified when Investor B threatened to seek the removal of the Company’s CEO and claimed to have shareholder backing. At the same time, Investor B signaled a willingness to divest a large portion of its holdings.

After a series of structured negotiations led by the next-generation leadership of Family Office A, a revised agreement emerged:

A substantial equity block was sold to Family Office A at a lower per-share price than initially proposed.

  • The opportunity to participate was extended to all shareholders, though none elected to purchase.

  • The transaction was completed shortly thereafter, consolidating Family Office A’s ownership position.

Aftermath and Strategic Implications

Following the transaction, Family Office A initiated a board restructuring to align governance with a renewed growth strategy. The CEO remained in place, and the Company began preparing for accelerated expansion.

Retrospectively, it appeared that Investor B may have faced liquidity pressures elsewhere in its portfolio, potentially influencing its willingness to sell at a discounted valuation. Recognizing and responding to counterparties’ broader financial constraints proved to be a decisive negotiating advantage.

Key Lessons for Family Offices

  1. Governance discipline matters internally as much as externally.

  2. Family dynamics and leadership structures can shape negotiation outcomes and reputational risk.

  3. Strategic misalignment among co-investors can create both friction and opportunity.

  4. Fair-process considerations—such as equal access to deal terms—are critical in multi-shareholder environments.

  5. Understanding counterparties’ broader financial pressures can provide leverage but must be balanced with long-term relationship considerations.

  6. Ownership consolidation often precedes governance reform and strategic repositioning.

Where to Build Skills

A growing ecosystem of executive education and professional programs supports leaders who want to embed structured negotiation and governance into their offices. Across Europe and the United States, compact certifications, executive formats and seminar‑style courses blend theory with case discussion, while professional associations focused on family enterprise complement these offerings with research, community, and practitioner standards.

Open Questions for Practice

  1. How do different family offices structure negotiations for assets, governance, and generational transition, and what methodologies correlate with stable outcomes over five to ten years?

  2. What behavioral and psychological routines—pre‑briefs, debriefs, red‑team reviews—most effectively reduce unproductive conflict?

  3. Do offices with formal negotiation protocols outperform informal offices on execution and cohesion?

  4. Which elements of methodology—process design, mediation, demand lists—travel best across cultural contexts?

  5. What type of technology is used in the pre-, during- and post-negotiation process in the family office, and how does technology help or challenge the journey?

Conclusion

In family offices, negotiation is inseparable from leadership. It converts complexity into clarity, aligns diverse interests, and protects relationships that must last for decades and sometimes generations. By adopting structured principles—preparation, clear openings, process leadership, and deliberate closings—families can make decisions that are both compassionate and rigorous. The result is durable agreements that advance long‑term vision and governance maturity. As wealth meets strategy, negotiation excellence becomes a core element of stewardship. Families who invest in disciplined process design and behavioral insight are better equipped to navigate the inevitable tensions of generational wealth, turning friction into advantage rather than liability.

About the Authors

Karin Mugnaini is a Senior Advisor for the N-Conference and other strategic events at Schranner Consulting AG, a global organization specializing in difficult and complex negotiations. With offices in Zurich, New York City, Hong Kong, and Dubai, the Schranner Negotiation Institute advises business and government leaders in more than 40 countries. Its methodology, the Schranner Concept®, is used by numerous Fortune 500 companies. Prior to joining the Schranner Negotiation Institute and Schranner Consulting AG, Karin built a career in strategy and business development across North America, Asia, and Europe in publishing, licensing, entertainment, luxury, and executive education. At Schranner Consulting AG, she supports the development and delivery of high-level events focused on excellence in negotiation and leadership under pressure. Karin holds an MBA from Georgetown University and a BA in Political Science from Smith College and is fluent in five languages.

Marc J. Sharpe is a senior investment leader with more than twenty‑five years in family office, private equity, and venture capital. Known for strategic insight, governance expertise, and the ability to foster innovation and value creation, he has built and led investment platforms that deliver sustainable growth while navigating complex financial and operational challenges. Marc is the Founder and Chairman of The Family Office Association, a global peer network of single‑family offices that has become a trusted forum for collaboration, market insight, and proprietary deal flow. He also teaches an MBA class on ‘The Entrepreneurial Family Office’ as an Adjunct Professor at Rice University and Southern Methodist University. He holds an M.A. from Cambridge University, an M.Phil. from Oxford University, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

References

  • Cascade Investment / Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts press releases: Sept 8, 2021. Four Seasons Press Room; PR Newswire (US$10B EV; founder stake).

  • Rothschild & Co / Concordia simplified tender offer filings: Feb–June 2023. Company and AMF postings (pricing, distributions, squeeze‑out intent).

  • Hermès vs. LVMH defense and subsequent legal proceedings: The Fashion Law; AInvest analyses (2010–2025).

  • SEC Private Fund Advisers rules and preferential treatment discussion (side letters): SEC resource page; DarrowEverett LLP analysis (2023–2024).

  • Patagonia ownership transition: Patagonia statement: ‘Earth is our only shareholder’ (Sept 14, 2022); CNBC coverage (Sept 14, 2022).

  • INGKA (IKEA) governance and foundation structure: INGKA Foundation Governance; Stichting INGKA Foundation (Wikipedia overview).

Disclosures

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a peer network of single family offices. Our community provides educational information and a forum to exchange ideas of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale, or distribution of any securities, nor does it provide investment advice. The material in this whitepaper is provided for informational purposes only and should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional. Nothing herein constitutes legal, accounting, tax, or investment advice, and no information in this document should be relied upon as such. References to organizations, products, services, or individuals do not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you make based on information provided by TFOA or its contributors are your sole responsibility. All investments involve risk, including the possible loss of principal. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Families should consult their advisers and consider their unique circumstances before making any investment or governance decisions. The TFOA name, logo, and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are trademarks or service marks of The Family Office Association. All other trademarks referenced herein are the property of their respective owners. All intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain their property and may be protected by applicable laws; no rights are transferred to you by virtue of this publication. Information presented in this whitepaper has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable; however, TFOA and the authors do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. The material is prepared solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user-specific advice.

Notes

  1. These case notes are compiled from public sources.↩︎

  2. This case study is compiled from private sources. All identities have been preserved to respect confidentiality.↩︎

GPU-Based Infrastructure – A New Frontier for Family Office Investing

Abstract

This whitepaper examines GPU (graphics processing unit)-based infrastructure as an emerging asset class for family offices, driven by the AI (artificial intelligence) boom since 2023. It outlines the economics of compute – measured in FLOPS (floating-point operations per second) – highlighting how networked GPUs generate predictable cash flows through training (capital-intensive model building) and inference (recurring real-time applications). Opportunities include structured financing for neocloud operators, yielding net internal rates of return (IRRs) in the mid-teens to mid-twenties over 3–5 years, secured by hard assets with low public market correlation. Key considerations include capital expenditures dominated by hardware, operating expenses led by power and cooling, and depreciation cycles that extend useful life beyond typical accounting periods. Risks span utilization variability and technology obsolescence, yet secondary markets support meaningful residual values. As AI capital expenditures scale significantly, family offices can access diversified yields comparable to mid-market private credit.

Executive Summary

Family offices allocating capital to private credit and real assets are increasingly encountering structured financing opportunities secured by revenue-generating graphics processing units (GPUs). These transactions can offer mid-teens to mid-twenties net IRRs with 3–5-year duration, low correlation to public markets, and hard-asset collateral. This whitepaper maps the underlying economics, risk factors, and structuring considerations in light of the explosive growth of this formerly niche strategy due to the recent boom in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Large Language Models (LLMs) since 2023.

The New Infrastructure Frontier

Artificial intelligence is the defining technological force of this decade, driving unprecedented demand for one fundamental input: compute. Compute refers to the essential hardware (GPUs, TPUs, CPUs, memory) and the processing power needed for training models and running AI tasks, measured primarily in FLOPS (Floating-Point Operations Per Second), indicating trillions or quadrillions of math calculations per second, showing how much raw power is available for complex AI workloads. It signifies the scale of resources for tasks like data processing, model training, and inference, determining model complexity and capability, with higher FLOPS equating to more powerful AI. Therefore, compute is the unseen energy behind everything from chatbots to autonomous vehicles. And the scale of the compute buildout is already visible in global capital expenditure forecasts, which project trillions of dollars flowing into AI-related data center infrastructure over the coming years.

At the center of this transformation lies the graphics processing unit, or GPU. Once designed for rendering images and games, GPUs now function as the core hardware in machine learning infrastructure. When networked together in servers and racks across data centers, GPUs form the computational fabric that makes artificial intelligence possible.

Yet unlike other essential resources such as energy or real estate, compute has no mature financial infrastructure built around it. Investors can own equity in the companies that use compute or build data centers to host it, but there is still no standardized way to invest directly in the utilization of compute itself. This paper explores how GPUs are used, how their economics work, and why an emerging ecosystem of operators and financial innovators are turning compute into a transparent, yield-bearing asset class.

How GPUs Are Used Today

Every digital interaction today, from searching the web to generating an image with artificial intelligence, relies on compute. GPUs are uniquely efficient at generating compute because they can perform thousands of calculations simultaneously. In AI, that capability enables neural networks to learn, recognize patterns, and make predictions. In essence, GPUs transform electricity and data into ‘intelligence’.

When deployed at scale inside data centers, thousands of GPUs are linked together into clusters that operate as compute farms. Think of them as the digital equivalent of power plants. Just as a turbine converts fuel into energy, these GPU clusters convert electricity into computational power, which AI developers rent by the hour to train or run their AI models.

The efficiency of that conversion – i.e., how much the GPUs are utilized — determines both the productivity and profitability of a specific GPU cluster. Utilization rate is typically measured on a 0–100% scale, indicating how much of the available compute power is actively in use. A cluster running at 90% utilization is generating revenue nearly around the clock, while one sitting at 50% is leaving half its capacity idle. The closer operators can keep their systems to full utilization, the more consistent and predictable their cash flow becomes.

For investors, this means compute capacity is not a speculative asset but a productive one. When managed by credible operators and leased under transparent contracts, GPU infrastructure produces predictable, yield-bearing cash flows similar to energy infrastructure. The more efficiently the GPUs are deployed and maintained, the more consistent the returns.

Training vs. Inference

AI workloads generally fall into two categories: training and inference. Understanding their distinctions is critical to evaluating risk, return, and duration.

  • Training uses massive GPU clusters to build foundational models, similar to constructing an oil refinery. These workloads are capital-intensive and cyclical but yield high utilization for defined periods.

  • Inference happens after the model is built. It refers to the process of using that trained model to make predictions, generate content, or answer questions in real time. When someone types a question into ChatGPT, they’re triggering inference. These workloads are continuous, lower intensity, and generate recurring revenue similar to power purchase agreements or SaaS contracts.

For investors, both are relevant. Training offers high short-term yield opportunities tied to specific projects, while inference provides more stable, long-term income streams.


Data Center Hosts vs. Neocloud Operators

To understand how GPUs are monetized, it’s important to distinguish between data center hosts and neocloud operators.

  • Data Center Hosts lease physical space, cooling, and power to tenants. They are essentially real estate and utility businesses and do not own the GPUs themselves.

  • Neocloud Operators represent a new class of companies that both own and operate GPUs, offering compute access directly to AI developers on demand.

These neoclouds are effectively the independent power producers of the AI age: capital-intensive, infrastructure-driven, and often seeking external financing to scale GPU clusters quickly. A potentially attractive GPU investment opportunity sits with small to medium-sized neocloud operators as these entities are too small to self-finance like hyperscalers, yet large enough to maintain stable utilization contracts with enterprise clients.

For investors evaluating compute exposure, Tier 2 and Tier 3 operators present a combination of return potential and risk diversification. These companies have strong, sustained demand for GPU capacity from AI developers but lack the low-cost financing available to large hyperscalers. That funding gap creates opportunity: family office investors who provide capital for GPUs can capture higher returns, secured by tangible assets and underpinned by contracted revenue from active GPU usage.

What Drives Capex and Why It’s Changing

We are in the midst of one of the largest capital buildouts in modern history. Technology investment, particularly in AI infrastructure, has reached a scale comparable to the most significant public works projects of the past century. AI-related Capex, including GPUs and data centers, already rivals the peak infrastructure spending related to electricity, broadband, and the interstate highway system.

The key drivers of capital expenditure for GPU infrastructure varies widely depending on hardware generation, power density, and facility readiness. Most of the total cost comes from the GPUs assembled into servers, while the remainder covers networking, cooling, and power delivery systems needed to keep them operating efficiently. In some cases, where there are specific software requirements to service a customer, the software can be included in capex as well.

  • Hardware Costs: High-performance GPU servers remain the largest expense. Pricing depends on supply availability and lead time, with newer models commanding a premium until supply catches up.

  • Generation Cycles: New GPUs release roughly every 18–24 months, increasing compute density and efficiency—but requiring periodic reinvestment.

  • Facility Readiness: Retrofitting existing centers vs. building greenfield sites changes capex profiles dramatically.

  • Interest Rates & Financing Costs: As with any capital-intensive industry, macro conditions impact expansion pace.

A notable trend is the rise in asset-light financing. Instead of operators purchasing GPUs outright, structured leases enable rapid scaling without balance-sheet strain, converting capex into manageable operating costs.

The Cost of Keeping Compute Online

Operating expenses (OpEx) represent the ongoing cash costs required to keep GPU infrastructure running. For most operators, power is the dominant expense, as modern GPU racks can draw 20–40 kilowatts each which is comparable to the load of an entire suburban home. These expenses define the baseline cost structure of a GPU cluster and directly influence the utilization required for sustainable profitability. A typical cash OpEx profile includes:

  • Power & Cooling (25–40%) – Electricity and cooling are the largest operating costs. Total expense depends on local energy pricing, power contracts, and the facility’s Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE), which measures how efficiently electricity is converted into usable compute.

  • Maintenance & Repairs (5–10%) – This includes hardware servicing, component failures, and ongoing software updates. Because GPU clusters operate continuously, routine maintenance is essential to sustaining uptime and predictable performance.

  • SG&A + Network Operations (10–15%) – Staffing, monitoring, connectivity, and bandwidth contribute to the operational overhead required to maintain reliable, secure, and responsive compute capacity.

  • Other Operating Costs (4–8%) – Insurance, colocation fees, cross-connects, spare parts inventory, and site-specific operational needs. The range varies based on facility type and deployment model.

Location remains one of the most significant determinants of OpEx. Many operators co-locate near regions with low-cost or renewable energy sources, such as hydroelectric, nuclear, geothermal, or flare-gas recovery sites, to reduce electricity costs and improve sustainability profiles. Others deploy containerized or modular micro–data centers to access cheaper power and accelerate deployment timelines without relying on traditional data center infrastructure.

In practice, data-center capacity in the United States is not spread evenly. It concentrates in a handful of metro areas and corridors where power availability, land costs, and network connectivity are most favorable. The map below illustrates this clustering: large numbers of facilities are grouped around a few key hubs rather than being evenly distributed across the country. That concentration reflects deliberate siting decisions designed to manage OpEx and ensure long-term access to reliable power and fiber.

How Compute Generates Cash Flow

Revenue in GPU operations stems from leasing compute hours to customers such as AI startups, research institutions, or enterprise clients. These contracts can take several forms:

  1. Fixed-Term Contracts: Multi-month or multi-year agreements that provide stable, predictable cash flows.

  2. On-Demand: Pay-as-you-go pricing, like traditional cloud services.

  3. Spot Market: Cost-effective option for AI companies offering unused capacity for short periods of time. These can be interrupted with short notice (typically a few minutes) to prioritize on-demand & contracted terms.

  4. Revenue-Share Models: Operators earn a portion of the client’s revenue that depends on compute usage.

Pricing for high-performance GPUs varies widely depending on contract length, supply conditions, and the level of service provided. Rates tend to be higher for dedicated clusters or premium support and lower for shared or short-term access. In practice, an operator’s revenue depends on the following factors:

  1. Services: Bare-metal, or software services on top? The best operators with the most valuable contracts offer more than bare-metal hardware. They offer software services to service their customers and a particular market niche.

  2. Utilization: The percentage of time GPUs are actively rented or in use.

  3. Unit Pricing: The effective hourly rate achieved across different clients and workloads.

  4. Contract Quality: The creditworthiness and reliability of offtake counterparties.

When these factors are managed well, GPU infrastructure behaves like a productive asset—generating recurring, measurable cash flow. Disciplined GPU management and high-quality contracts can make revenue streams from compute infrastructure resemble those of traditional income-generating assets such as energy projects or equipment leasing.

Asset Life Cycles & Depreciation

GPU depreciation behaves very differently from traditional IT hardware. Rather than becoming obsolete when new chips are released, GPUs transition through multiple workload phases and retain meaningful value over long periods. For investors, this creates predictable collateral behavior and durable cash-flow profiles whereby GPUs behave more like income-producing infrastructure than short-lived IT equipment.

  • Book Value Depreciation (Accounting) – Under GAAP/IFRS, GPU servers are depreciated over 5–6 years using straight-line depreciation (≈16–20% annually). While this defines how the asset appears on financial statements, it does not reflect real market value or economic life, which typically extends beyond the accounting horizon.

  • Economic Depreciation (Real Useful Life) – In practice, GPUs remain revenue-producing for 6–8+ years as workloads cascade and because inference requirements grow more slowly than training, older GPUs continue to serve valuable roles well beyond their book life.

    • Years 0–3: Frontier training and high-performance workloads

    • Years 4–7+: Inference, fine-tuning, research, rendering, batch jobs, enterprise AI

  • Market Depreciation (Resale Value Behavior) – Global demand for compute, backward-compatible software (CUDA), and deep secondary markets all support slower, smoother value decline compared to typical IT hardware. Most data-center GPUs retain 45–65% of their value at Year 3 and 25–35% at Year 5.

The Emerging Yield Curve of Compute

While returns vary by structure, GPU-based investments exhibit characteristics familiar to family offices investors who are accustomed to asset-backed credit or equipment leasing.

  • Gross Yields: 25–60% annually, depending on utilization and cost of capital.

  • Net Yields: 15–30% after OpEx and depreciation. GPU yields of 15-30% represent a significant premium over the ~10-11% returns usually available in private credit markets.

  • Duration: Typical investment horizons of 3–5 years, aligned with GPU upgrade cycles.

  • Residual Value: Older GPUs are often redeployed from training to inference workloads, extending useful life and maintaining residual resale value.

Importantly, compute yields are not directly correlated to equity or bond markets. Instead, they follow technology-specific cycles tied to AI adoption and hardware lifecycles. For family offices seeking differentiated yield exposure, this emerging asset class offers diversification anchored in tangible infrastructure. Therefore, a well-structured GPU portfolio should be able to achieve stable returns comparable to mid-market private credit, with the added upside of technology appreciation during high-demand cycles.

Key Risks for Family Offices Investing in GPUs

Investing in GPUs carries risks that family offices should evaluate, including but not limited to operator execution, utilization, and technology cycles. Returns depend on GPUs being deployed with disciplined up-time and consistently high utilization, supported by reliable customers and stable access to power. Variability in workload demand or increases in energy costs can influence margins, which is why underwriting operator capability and site selection remain essential.

Depreciation also plays a role. GPUs retain meaningful utility across multiple workload tiers, but newer generations can shorten the economic life of older hardware if not structured thoughtfully. Clear contract terms, realistic depreciation assumptions, and diversified exposure across operators and regions can help to mitigate this dynamic.

Overall, the risks resemble those found in other private credit and infrastructure opportunities: counterparty quality, operating discipline, depreciation management, and cost control. With careful diligence, compute can function as a transparent, asset-backed exposure to the underlying growth of AI.

Conclusion

Compute is the most fundamental resource of the modern era. It is the raw power that transforms information into intelligence. For family offices and institutional investors, understanding its economics is the first step toward participating in a market expected to surpass $7 trillion in capital expenditure by 2030. As GPUs evolve from technical equipment to structured financial assets, investors who engage early can position themselves at the foundation of the next generational infrastructure cycle. Innovation in financial architecture will define the sustainability of the AI revolution and family offices are ideally positioned as a source of flexible and patient capital to support the next industrial revolution in the intelligence economy.

Bibliography


About the Authors

Nikolay Filichkin is a business development and partnerships executive with deep experience across enterprise technology and high-growth operating environments. As Chief Business Officer of Compute Labs, Mr. Filichkin leads strategic partnerships and capital deployment initiatives to support the firm’s mission to build the capital markets for compute. Prior to joining Compute Labs, Mr. Filichkin held senior roles at Xsolla, where he led cross-border acquisitions, launched new product lines, and built go-to-market functions that supported the company’s global expansion. His background spans strategic sales, M&A execution, and operational scale-up across both early-stage and growth-stage organizations. Mr. Filichkin is recognized for fostering durable partnerships and guiding complex initiatives from inception to revenue realization. Contact: nick@computelabs.ai

Warren Hosseinion is a capital markets and growth professional with experience spanning public-market M&A, investor relations, marketing, and corporate development across AI infrastructure, biotechnology, and emerging technology sectors. As Head of Capital Markets and Growth at Compute Labs, Mr. Hosseinion oversees investor relations, fundraising strategy, and market positioning as the firm develops structured investment products for the compute asset class. Mr. Hosseinion brings previous experience as Vice President of M&A at Voyager Acquisition Corp. (NASDAQ: VACH), where focused on deal sourcing, transaction execution and due diligence. He also brings experience as Chief Operating Officer of Vesicor Therapeutics, helping guide their go-public strategy and daily operations. Contact: warren@computelabs.ai

Marc J. Sharpe is a global investment executive and board member with a distinguished career spanning family office management, private equity, venture capital, and investment banking. Known for his strategic insight, deep expertise in family office governance, and ability to foster innovation and value creation, Mr. Sharpe has built and led investment platforms that deliver sustainable growth while navigating complex financial and operational challenges. His leadership style emphasizes integrity, continuous improvement, and long-term partnerships that generate significant stakeholder value. Mr. Sharpe is the Founder and Chairman of The Family Office Association, a premier global peer network of single-family offices. Since 2007, he has cultivated a community of senior family office executives and principals representing some of the world’s wealthiest families, promoting education, shared-best practices, and co-investment opportunities. Under his leadership, TFOA has become a trusted forum for collaboration, market insight, and proprietary investment deal flow on a global scale. He also teaches an MBA class on “The Entrepreneurial Family Office” as an Adjunct Professor at Rice University and Southern Methodist University. Mr. Sharpe holds an M.A. from Cambridge University, an M.Phil. from Oxford University, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members, and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families: www.tfoa.info

Disclosures

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a peer network of single family offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All of the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

This material is for educational purposes only and is not investment, legal, accounting, or tax advice. It does not constitute an offer to buy or sell any security or digital asset, or a solicitation to engage in any investment strategy. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk, including possible loss of principal. Families should consult their advisers and consider their unique circumstances before making any investment decisions.

Bitcoin as a Strategic Asset for Family Offices

Abstract

Family offices seek to preserve purchasing power, prudently grow capital, and reflect family values across generations. Traditional portfolios—heavy in equities, bonds, private markets, and real estate—face structural pressure from persistent inflation, high public debt and net‑interest burdens, rising cross‑asset correlations, and liquidity traps in illiquid alternatives. This whitepaper explores how a measured Bitcoin allocation can complement a family’s core portfolio by adding a programmable scarcity hedge, a low‑correlation return stream, and long‑term growth optionality. It also provides practical guidance on sizing, phasing, custody, governance, and liquidity planning to integrate Bitcoin in line with a conservative family‑office mandate.

Executive Summary

  • The evolving macro environment has weakened traditional diversification: cash and bonds struggle against inflation and provide less diversification, while equities, credit, and real estate have become more correlated in times of stress.

  • Bitcoin’s core attributes—finite supply, decentralization, and independence from fiat monetary policy—map to three family‑office objectives: preserve purchasing power, diversify real risks, and retain growth optionality.

  • A modest 1–5% sleeve can improve portfolio resilience without dominating governance or liquidity. Historically, Bitcoin’s correlations to equities and bonds have been low, while long‑run CAGRs have been high (with significant volatility).

  • Implementation should emphasize phased entry (i.e. dollar cost averaging), policy‑based rebalancing, institutional‑grade custody—preferably multi‑institution, multi‑signature—and a total‑return approach to generate cash when needed.

  • Values alignment is also possible given credible narratives around financial inclusion, human‑rights resilience, and supporting the energy transition.

1) The family‑office mandate—and why the old toolkit is strained today

The family office mandate spans more than annual returns: protect real wealth, fund multi‑decade commitments, and transmit values and governance to the next generation. That mandate is harder in an era of persistent fiscal deficits, rising debt‑to‑GDP, and growing federal debt net‑interest costs that can pressure fiat purchasing power over time.

At the portfolio level, five structural weaknesses are increasingly visible:

1) inflation erosion benefits in cash and bonds.

2) liquidity traps in private equity and real estate.

3) higher stock–bond correlation that undermines 60/40 defenses.

4) elevated valuations in risk assets; and

5) intense competition for quality deals.

Traditional ‘diversification’ often adds instruments that share the same underlying risks.

2) Why Bitcoin? Three strategic roles

A) Preservation: a programmatic hedge against monetary debasement

Bitcoin’s monetary policy is fixed in decentralized code practically impossible to alter, supply is asymptotically capped at 21 million, and issuance is transparently reduced over time. This removes discretionary dilution risk. In a world where deficits are structural and balance‑sheet expansion is a recurring tool, exposure to an asset with rule‑based scarcity can help protect intergenerational purchasing power.

In practice, Bitcoin is probably best understood as a modern complement to gold and quality real assets. It is not a panacea: drawdowns can be severe, and short term price behavior is volatile. But over long horizons, its scarcity mechanism makes it a credible hedge against currency debasement—especially when sized prudently within a diversified portfolio.

Exhibit 1. Macro context: USA – Total Federal Outlays and Revenues

Exhibit 1 chart

Source: CBO’s February 2024 report The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034.

Exhibit 2. Macro context: USA- Federal Debt Held by the Public as a % of GDP

Exhibit 2 chart

Source: CBO’s February 2024 report The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034.

Exhibit 3. Bitcoin vs. 2Y inflation expectations (YoY)

Exhibit 3 chart

Source: Onramp Bitcoin, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Investing.com

B) Diversification: low correlation when it counts

Diversification works only if return drivers differ. Bitcoin’s return stream is largely orthogonal to earnings cycles and interest‑rate policy because it is driven by protocol rules, network adoption, and liquidity cycles unique to the asset. Over multi‑year windows, correlations with broad equities and aggregate bonds have tended to hover near zero. For families already fully exposed to equity beta, credit, and real assets, “different’ matters more than ‘more.”

A 1–5% sleeve typically suffices to introduce this independent risk/return profile. The goal is not to chase every rally but to insert a genuine diversifier that can buffer the portfolio during synchronized sell‑offs in traditional assets. Paired with rules‑based rebalancing, even a small sleeve can contribute meaningfully to long-term portfolio resilience.

Exhibit 4. Correlation Matrix — Bitcoin & Major Asset Classes – Jun 30, 2020 – Jun 30, 2025

Exhibit 4 chart

Source: Data – Bloomberg; Calculations – Onramp Bitcoin

C) Growth optionality: asymmetric upside from a capped‑supply network

Families require growth to offset inflation and fund future obligations. Bitcoin’s long‑term return profile has been characterized by high compounding potential alongside high volatility. As adoption expands while supply remains capped, the asset exhibits asymmetric upside akin to owning a call option on a growing monetary network.

Capital efficiency is an additional benefit: to add a modest increment to expected real return, a small Bitcoin sleeve can substitute for much larger shifts in equities or bonds, preserving liquidity for other priorities. For many families, the asset also serves as a bridge to next‑gen engagement—digital‑native heirs intuitively understand its design and relevance.

Exhibit 5. CAGR vs. traditional assets and allocation required for +1% expected real return

Exhibit 5 chart

3) Implementation without drama

Sizing and phasing

Target a 1–5% range of total assets, calibrated to spending needs and drawdown tolerance. Families with higher liquidity requirements or lower risk appetite should sit at the low end; others can scale by policy once governance and custody are battle‑tested. Phase entry using dollar‑cost averaging over several quarters to desensitize timing and build cultural comfort. Pair with a rebalancing band (e.g., ±100–200 bps) to harvest volatility mechanically.

Exhibit 6. Policy pathway: start at 1%, DCA to 3%, quarterly rebalancing bands, governance ‘gate’ for >5%

Exhibit 6 chart

Liquidity: a total‑return playbook

Bitcoin does not pay a coupon. Treat it as a total‑return sleeve. Monetize a small, rules‑based portion of gains during favorable windows—for example, trim when the sleeve exceeds its upper band—to fund distributions, capital calls, or new commitments. This converts appreciation into liquidity without dismantling the core exposure. Keep a written policy to avoid ad‑hoc decisions during volatility spikes.

Resilient Custody

Institutional‑grade custody is non‑negotiable. The emerging best practice is multi‑institution, multi‑signature custody (MIC). Keys are split across qualified custodians and/or trustees in distinct jurisdictions; transactions require 2‑of‑3 or 3‑of‑5 approvals; and insurance coverage is in place. MIC reduces single points of failure, strengthens legal resilience, and enforces dual‑control.

Decide up front:

  • Movement thresholds (e.g., board approval above defined amounts).

  • Jurisdiction strategy (custodians across complementary regulatory regimes).

  • Whitelisting and address‑control procedures for outbound transfers.

Exhibit 7. Example of Multi Institution Custody Scenario

Exhibit 7 chart

Policy, compliance, and documentation

Add a Bitcoin mandate to the Investment Policy Statement (IPS): purpose (hedge/diversifier/growth), target range and phasing, rebalancing rules, liquidity plan, custody standards, valuation/pricing source, reporting cadence, and escalation criteria. Maintain live tax and regulatory checklists; rules evolve. Schedule quarterly reviews and an annual deep dive.

Sample IPS insertion (illustrative)

Purpose and role: Bitcoin is included as a strategic diversifier and potential hedge against monetary debasement, with long‑term growth optionality. Target allocation: 3% of total assets, with an allowed range of 2–5%. Phasing: Dollar‑cost average over at least four quarters to initial target. Rebalancing: Maintain within ±150 bps of target; trims above the upper band fund distributions or new commitments. Custody: Assets held with qualified custodians in a multi‑signature, multi‑institution structure, with insurance coverage. Compliance: All activity subject to legal and tax review; pricing from an approved source; quarterly reporting to the Investment Committee. Review: Annual deep dive and quarterly check‑ins; any move beyond 5% requires explicit IC approval.

4) Values and legacy: making the impact case credible

Many families integrate philanthropy and values into their investment approach. With careful framing, Bitcoin can reinforce—rather than conflict with—key priorities:

  • Financial inclusion: borderless access to savings and payments where banking is fragile; lower‑cost remittances in certain corridors.

  • Human rights: resilience to censorship and seizures under authoritarian regimes; ability to support at‑risk communities when traditional rails are restricted.

  • Energy transition: miners as flexible buyers of last resort for intermittent renewables; potential methane‑mitigation when collocated with flared‑gas sites.

Back the narrative with data and governance: disclose custody standards, report on energy‑use metrics where appropriate, and align philanthropic initiatives with measurable outcomes. Include next gen family members in oversight roles to strengthen continuity and engagement.

5) Key risks and practical mitigations

  • Price volatility: mitigate via small sizing, DCA entry, and rules‑based rebalancing bands.

  • Operational/custody risk: mitigate via MIC, segregation of duties, whitelists, and audited processes.

  • Liquidity risk: plan liquidity with a total‑return playbook; avoid forced selling during stress.

  • Reputational risk: align narrative with values; communicate policy and safeguards clearly to stakeholders.

6) Mini‑checklist for the IC pack

  • Mandate: Target band (e.g., 1–3%); escalation criteria to 5%.

  • Phasing: DCA schedule by quarter; volatility gates; pause conditions.

  • Rebalancing: banded policy with trims to fund distributions; avoid discretionary chasing.

  • Custody: MIC with 2‑of‑3; jurisdiction diversification; insurance requirements.

  • Operations: dual‑control workflows; address whitelists; cold‑storage standards; audit trail.

  • Compliance/Tax: counsel and CPA review; disclosures; board minutes and approvals.

  • Education: standing agenda item; next-gen participation

7) Methodology notes (for the investment committee)

Inflation expectations: When comparing Bitcoin behavior with inflation regimes, use survey‑based expectations and market‑based measures (e.g., breakeven inflation). Regime identification should avoid look‑ahead bias and should be robust to alternative windows (12–36 months).

Real‑return framing: When evaluating contribution to expected real return, anchor to a long‑term inflation assumption (e.g., 2%). Illustrations that compare allocations needed to add +1% real return should clarify that all results are sensitive to the horizon, regime definition, and the choice of proxies for each asset class.

Risk measurement: For drawdown analysis, use peak‑to‑trough declines on closing prices and report both depth and duration. For family‑office governance, emphasize scenario‑based stress (e.g., policy shock, liquidity crunch, sharp tightening) rather than relying solely on variance.

Back testing hygiene: Use transparent data sources, specify windows, and put confidence bands around point estimates. Where possible, show robustness checks (e.g., multiple start dates for DCA, alternative rebalance bands).

8) FAQs for principals and trustees

Short answers you can use in Investment Committee packs and trustee briefings:

  • “Isn’t Bitcoin too volatile?” — The sleeve is intentionally small (1–5%) and phased in. Volatility at the sleeve level can be an asset when rebalancing is systematic, because it realizes gains without relying on market timing.

  • “Why not just buy a crypto fund or ETF?” — Pooled vehicles can be appropriate, but direct ownership plus institutional custody (or a separately managed account with qualified custodians) gives greater control over counterparties, geography, and security policies.

  • “What about taxes?” — Tax treatment varies by jurisdiction. Maintain a transaction log and pricing source and obtain tax advice before implementing rebalancing or income‑generation overlays.

  • “Can we earn yield on Bitcoin?” —A conservative family office can treat Bitcoin as a total‑return asset and generate liquidity via policy‑based trims instead.

Conclusion

In an era of fiscal imbalances and correlated traditional assets, Bitcoin has a role as a strategic complement for family offices aiming to preserve purchasing power, diversify risks, and capture growth optionality. Its fixed supply, decentralized governance, and independence from fiat policies position it as a hedge against monetary debasement, with historical correlations to equities and bonds near zero over multi-year periods1. A modest 1-5% allocation can enhance portfolio resilience—historically delivering high compound annual growth rates (CAGRs) while allowing systematic rebalancing to harvest volatility—without overwhelming liquidity or governance. Implementation requires dollar-cost averaging (DCA) for phased entry, multi-institution, multi-signature custody to mitigate operational risks, and integration into the Investment Policy Statement (IPS) with clear rebalancing bands and liquidity plans. Key risks like price volatility and custody failures are addressable through small sizing, rules-based processes, and audited controls. Overall, a prudent Bitcoin sleeve aligns with intergenerational mandates, offering asymmetric upside in a capped-supply network amid structural macro pressures, provided families consult advisers for tailored execution.

Notes

  1. As shown in the correlation matrix from June 2020 to June 2025 (Source: Bloomberg data via Onramp Bitcoin).↩︎

About The Authors

Glenn Cameron is Global Head of Onramp Institutional and Chief Investment Officer of Acropolis Treasury, where he works with family offices, institutions and corporate treasuries on Bitcoin strategy, governance and portfolio integration. He has more than two decades of experience in multi asset portfolio management and investment consulting across the US, UK, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Prior to joining Onramp, Glenn was Senior Investment Consultant & Head of Digital Assets at Cartwright, where he led the advice behind the first British pension scheme allocation to Bitcoin, and before that he was a Portfolio Manager & Head of Asset Allocation at Sanlam Investments, managing multi asset and alternative investment portfolios. He has held earlier leadership roles in investment consulting and derivatives trading and holds the CFA and FMVA designations. Contact: glenn@onrampbitcoin.com

Onramp Institutional is the institutional advisory and solutions arm of Onramp, focused exclusively on Bitcoin for fiduciaries. The team works with boards, CIOs, treasurers and risk committees to build a defensible process around Bitcoin: executive and committee briefings, portfolio and liquidity modelling, wrapper and custody design (including multi institution custody vaults), and governance and audit documentation. Onramp operates alongside clients’ existing legal, tax and consulting relationships to help them evaluate, size and structure modest Bitcoin sleeves that are auditable, compliant and operationally robust for family offices and other long term allocators: www.onrampbitcoin.com

Marc J. Sharpe is a global investment executive and board member with a distinguished career spanning family office management, private equity, venture capital, and investment banking. Known for his strategic insight, deep expertise in family office governance, and ability to foster innovation and value creation, Mr. Sharpe has built and led investment platforms that deliver sustainable growth while navigating complex financial and operational challenges. His leadership style emphasizes integrity, continuous improvement, and long-term partnerships that generate significant stakeholder value. Mr. Sharpe is the Founder and Chairman of The Family Office Association, a premier global peer network of single-family offices. Since 2007, he has cultivated a community of senior family office executives and principals representing some of the world’s wealthiest families, promoting education, shared-best practices, and co-investment opportunities. Under his leadership, TFOA has become a trusted forum for collaboration, market insight, and proprietary investment deal flow on a global scale. He also teaches an MBA class on “The Entrepreneurial Family Office” as an Adjunct Professor at Rice University and Southern Methodist University. Mr. Sharpe holds an M.A. from Cambridge University, an M.Phil. from Oxford University, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members, and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families: www.tfoa.info

Disclosures

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a peer network of single family offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All of the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

This material is for educational purposes only and is not investment, legal, accounting, or tax advice. It does not constitute an offer to buy or sell any security or digital asset, or a solicitation to engage in any investment strategy. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk, including possible loss of principal. Families should consult their advisers and consider their unique circumstances before making any investment decisions.

Real Estate Royalties for Multi-Generational Families

Abstract

This whitepaper examines the investment opportunity for family offices to allocate capital to real estate royalties. Modern unsubordinated, triple-net, long-term ground leases separate land ownership from improvements, creating the senior-most real estate claim: contractual, inflation-protected income with no lessor operating burden and full reversion of improvements at maturity. Institutions from the Catholic Church to leading universities have compounded wealth through this structure for centuries with no realized losses. Recent standardization has made the asset class accessible at institutional scale via specialized vehicles. For multi-generational family offices, ground leases deliver equity-like returns at markedly lower volatility than core real estate, substantial estate-tax valuation discounts, full like-kind exchange eligibility, and negligible management intensity. A modest allocation to ground lease assets can strengthen after-tax, intergenerational capital preservation and is worth consideration for family offices with patient capital, especially those considering multigeneration estate plans.

Introduction

One of the distinct advantages family offices have over traditional institutional capital is the ability to invest patiently over long cycles, often generations. Family offices therefore benefit the most from investments that compound purchasing power over decades while preserving capital and imposing almost no operational burden on staff or principals. Modern ground leases deliver on all three of these requirements in a way that traditional real estate equity, private credit, and most fixed-income alternatives cannot.

In a ground lease, the landowner (formally the lessor or fee owner) retains outright ownership of the land while leasing it for a long term, almost always 99 years in institutional structures, to a tenant or lessee who constructs and owns the buildings and any improvements. The lessee pays rent on the land only and assumes full responsibility for property taxes, insurance, maintenance, and all operating costs under a triple-net (NNN) lease. At expiration, the lessee surrenders the improvements to the lessor in good condition and at no additional cost. This separation of land ownership from building ownership creates what are often referred to as “real estate royalties” (i.e., a senior, contractual, inflation-protected income stream plus a free, embedded option on decades of property appreciation).

Institutions as diverse as the Catholic Church, the British Crown, Harvard University, Yale University, and the University of Texas System have employed ground leases for hundreds of years to compound wealth with zero realized losses. And, since 2017, with the standardization of the modern unsubordinated, triple-net, 99-year ground lease, this asset class has become accessible on an institutional scale to private family office investors.

Historical Context and Provenance

Ground leases trace their origins to English common law and were imported to the American colonies. Early examples include Dutch patroonships in New York and ecclesiastical leases in Hawaii. In the twentieth century, universities and municipalities adopted the structure to monetize land without surrendering control. The University of California, Irvine, the University of Texas System, and the City of New York have collectively generated billions in present-value rent while retaining reversionary rights that will mature in the twenty-second and twenty-third centuries.

The modern institutional version differs materially from older subordinated or short-term leases. It is always unsubordinated — meaning the lessor’s land is not collateral for the lessee’s construction or permanent financing — and contains lender-protective provisions that make the leasehold estate fully financeable with commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) or bank debt. These innovations eliminated the primary historical friction: leasehold lenders’ fear that the fee owner could wipe out their collateral in a tenant bankruptcy. With that risk removed, the asset class is increasingly being seen as an attractive alternative for long term family office investors.

Detailed Mechanics of the Institutional Ground Lease

A contemporary ground lease transaction typically begins with a developer or owner who controls a site but wishes to minimize deployed equity. The ground lease investor purchases the land (or funds it in a forward commitment) at 30–45% of total project cost and leases it back under the following core terms:

  • Term: 99 years (the longest term that avoids perpetual lease rules in most states).

  • Rent: Initial yield of 4.5–5.75% on land value, producing a blended project cap rate of approximately 6.5–8.0%.

  • Escalators: Either (a) fixed 2.0–2.5% annual compounding, or (b) periodic CPI lookbacks (usually every 10 years) with collars of 1.5–3.5% per period or 20–35% cumulative.

  • Triple-net: Lessee pays absolutely everything — property taxes, insurance, maintenance, capital expenditures.

  • Unsubordinated fee: Lessor’s land is senior to all leasehold debt.

  • Reversion: Improvements revert to lessor at maturity in good condition, with no payment to lessee.

The economics separate into two distinct value components for the lessor:

  • The income component: a growing, senior, contractual cash flow stream that resembles an inflation-linked bond issued by a real estate-secured credit tenant.

  • The reversionary or “Caret” component: the right to receive, at zero additional cost, all improvements existing at lease maturity.

Please refer to Appendix A for an explicit illustration of how ground lease economics work in practice.

Comprehensive Risk Assessment

Ground leases sit at the absolute top of the real estate capital stack. In tenant bankruptcy or leasehold foreclosure, the land survives intact and any leasehold lender must continue paying rent or forfeit the improvements. This structural seniority explains the zero-loss history. The principal risks of ground leases are well understood and can be systematically mitigated with the appropriate planning and structuring.

  • Tenant credit default is the most frequently cited concern. Managers address it through rigorous underwriting that requires either investment-grade credit or strong institutional sponsorship, coupled with minimum rent coverage ratios of 2.5–3.5 times.

  • Insufficient inflation protection is eliminated in institutional leases via periodic CPI lookbacks (typically every ten years with collars) or, in retail properties, percentage-rent participation clauses that explicitly preserve purchasing power.

  • Reversion risk—the theoretical possibility that improvements will be worthless at lease maturity in year 99—is effectively nonexistent. Conservative initial land allocations of 30–45% of total project cost, combined with the 99-year term and long-term real estate appreciation trends, ensure the reversionary interest retains substantial value.

  • Interest-rate duration risk represents the primary source of mark-to-market volatility. Macaulay duration approximates 50–60 years, making the asset class sensitive to rate movements.1 Contractual cash flows, however, remain completely unaffected by interim price fluctuations.

  • Liquidity varies by vehicle. Private fund holdings are inherently illiquid, though a secondary market continues to develop. Investors seeking daily liquidity can access a public REIT (Safehold), accepting equity-like volatility in exchange.

  • Relative to core real estate, ground leases deliver comparable expected nominal returns—8–10% unlevered—while exhibiting roughly 40–50% of the volatility, placing them in the upper-left quadrant of the risk-return spectrum.

Acquisition and Origination Strategies

Family offices access ground leases through four primary channels, listed below from most common to most bespoke:

  • Commingled private funds: These funds originate new leases and acquire existing ones at targeted net IRRs of 8–12%.

  • Club deals: Allows geographic, property-type, or escalator customization. Requires internal real estate staff in addition to trusted advisors.

  • Direct origination: This option is only for largest family offices and those with dedicated in-house real estate teams. Investments typically take 6–18 months from term sheet to funding and the process includes:

    • Identifying developers or owners seeking to recycle equity.

    • Negotiate land value (usually 30–45% of total project cost).

    • Execute simultaneous land purchase and 99-year lease (using institutional template).

    • Fund at closing or via forward commitment.

  • Public REIT: Safehold Inc. (NYSE: SAFE) is currently the only public pure-play ground lease company that trades in the public markets. It provides daily liquidity and exposure to a diversified national portfolio, albeit with equity market volatility and a significant discount to NAV.

Secondary acquisition of existing ground leases is growing. Universities, municipalities, and some family owners periodically monetize portions of their portfolios. These trades usually occur off market through intermediaries and specialist advisors.

Tax Considerations for U.S. Family Offices

Tax treatment is a major reason sophisticated family offices find ground leases attractive2. For the lessor (the family office investor):

  • Ground rent received is taxed as ordinary income (current federal rates up to 37% + 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax + state taxes).

  • No depreciation deduction is available on the land itself (land is non-depreciable), and the lessor owns no improvements during the term.

  • Property taxes, insurance, and operating expenses are paid by the lessee — fully tax-deductible to the lessee but never expensed by the lessor.

  • Interest expense on leverage secured by the leased fee is deductible against rent (subject to normal limitations).

At lease maturity or upon earlier sale:

  • Reversion of improvements: The IRS generally treats the receipt of improvements at maturity as nontaxable return of property if the lease qualifies as a true lease. The lessor takes a zero basis in the reverted improvements. If sold immediately, the entire proceeds are capital gain (20% federal + 3.8% NIIT + state). Many lessors hold or 1031 exchange the mature property3.

  • Sale of leased fee during term: Eligible for Section 1031 exchange into another ground lease or other real property, deferring capital gains tax indefinitely across generations. This is a powerful intergenerational planning tool.

  • Estate tax valuation: The IRS values a ground lease interest at the present value of remaining rents plus discounted reversion. Using IRS Section 7520 rates (4–6% currently), a newly originated 99-year lease is typically valued at 80–90% of invested capital for estate purposes, creating a built-in estate-tax discount. When held in intentionally defective grantor trusts or dynasty trusts in Delaware, Nevada, or South Dakota, the discounted value plus future appreciation can grow outside the taxable estate permanently.

Additional nuances:

  • Opportunity Zone ground leases can provide tax deferral on prior gains plus 10-year basis step-up.

  • Charitable remainder trusts (CRTs) can hold ground leases to generate high current income for principals while achieving charitable deductions.

  • GST-exempt dynasty trusts can own ground leases to compound for centuries without estate or GST tax at each generation.

In contrast, direct fee-simple real estate generates depreciation recapture at 25% on sale, annual phantom income if leveraged, and full fair-market-value inclusion in estates.

Conclusion

Ground leases represent the purest form of real estate ownership available in a leveraged world: perpetual land control, growing senior income, no operating burden, and a tax-efficient embedded call option on future development value. For multi-generational family offices navigating ‘higher-for-longer’ interest rates, fiscal uncertainty, and generational transfer planning, a strategic allocation to modern ground leases can materially improve portfolio durability, after-tax compounding, and sleep-at-night quality. In the current market environment, commercial real estate transaction volume has recovered from the 2023–2024 lows, yet all-in debt costs remain 6.5–8.0% for many property types. Developers and owners are increasingly using ground leases to reduce equity requirements from 30–35% to 15–20%, creating abundant supply for lessors. Institutional ownership of the $20+ trillion U.S. commercial real estate stock remains below 0.5%, indicating decades of runway for this unique real estate asset class.

Bibliography

  • Carr, Christopher. 2023. “An Argument for the More Widespread Use of Ground Leases in the United States: How to Align Pertinent Interests and Strategically Implement on an Impactful Scale.” Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

  • Group RMC. n.d. “Real Estate Royalties / Ground Leases: The Pearl of Real Estate.”

  • Kamdem, Ronald, Adam Kramer, Kelly E. Whelan, and Sarah Obaidi. 2023. “Safehold Inc. | North America: A New (Long) Lease on Land; Resume at OW, $33 PT.” Morgan Stanley, October 30.

  • Libou, Shaun. 2024. “Ground Level.” Raymond James / AFIRE Summit Issue 16.

  • Lorman Education Services. 2018. “Ground Lease Fundamentals – What Distinguishes a Ground Lease and Why.”

  • Mayne, Florence P. 2002. “Ground Leases: Basic Legal Issues.” Presented at the Association of University Real Estate Officials 22nd Annual Meeting, Austin, TX, September 24.

  • Safehold Inc. 2025. “Safehold Reports Third Quarter 2025 Results.”

  • Safehold Inc. 2025. “Q3 2025 Earnings Presentation.”

Appendix A

Consider a $100 million ground lease investment on a new multifamily project with a total combined property value (CPV) of $285.7 million. Land is allocated 35% of CPV ($100 million) and improvements 65% ($185.7 million).

Step 1 — Calculate initial annual rent.

  • Initial yield = 5.00%

  • Year 1 rent = 5.00% × $100 million = $5.00 million

Step 2 — Apply fixed escalator4.

  • Year 10 rent = $5.00 million × (1.02)^9 = $5.98 million

  • Year 30 rent = $5.00 million × (1.02)^29 = $9.08 million

  • Year 50 rent = $5.00 million × (1.02)^49 = $13.80 million

  • Year 99 rent = $5.00 million × (1.02)^98 = $34.76 million

Step 3 — Calculate cumulative undiscounted cash flow over the term. This is the future value of a growing annuity:

  • Cumulative cash = $5.00 million × [(1.02)^99 – 1] / 0.02 ≈ $1,803 million

Step 4 — Estimate reversion value assuming total property appreciates at a conservative 2.75% annually5.

  • Year 99 CPV = $285.7 million × (1.0275)^99 ≈ $1,420 million

  • Assuming land remains ~35% of CPV at maturity, land value ≈ $497 million.

  • Improvement reversion to lessor ≈ $923 million

Step 5 — Total undiscounted value created.

  • Cumulative rent is $1,803 million + reversion $923 million = $2,726 million on $100 million invested, or 27.3× money over 99 years.

Even discounting intermediate cash flows and reversion at a 6.25% required IRR (typical for the asset class today), the transaction still generates an unlevered IRR of approximately 8.1%. Adding conservative 55% non-recourse leverage at SOFR + 225 bps pushes levered IRR to 12–14% with ground-lease-to-value remaining below 45%.

Assumptions:

  • The above example uses modern, unsubordinated, 99-year, triple-net ground leases with institutional protections.

  • Long-term appreciation 2.75% nominal; CPI 2.0–3.0%; tax rates reflect current law as of November 2025.

Notes

  • Macaulay duration measures the weighted average time (in years) an investor must hold a fixed-income instrument to receive the present value of all future cash flows equal to its current price. Developed by Frederick Macaulay in 1938, it represents the economic maturity of a bond or similar cash flow stream rather than its legal maturity.↩︎

  • Specific tax advice is beyond the scope of this whitepaper, and we highly recommend consulting with an expert when it comes to tax related questions. No specific tax advice is provided in this whitepaper. Family-specific structures require qualified counsel.↩︎

  • A Section 1031 exchange, named for Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 1031, permits deferral of capital gains taxes on the sale of investment or business-use real property when proceeds are reinvested in like-kind replacement property of equal or greater value.↩︎

  • Assumes 2.00% annual fixed increases, compounded.↩︎

  • The long-term U.S. commercial real estate average per NCREIF.↩︎

About the Author

Marc J. Sharpe is a global investment executive and board member with a distinguished career spanning family office management, private equity, venture capital, and investment banking. Known for his strategic insight, deep expertise in family office governance, and ability to foster innovation and value creation, Mr. Sharpe has built and led investment platforms that deliver sustainable growth while navigating complex financial and operational challenges. His leadership style emphasizes integrity, continuous improvement, and long-term partnerships that generate significant stakeholder value. Mr. Sharpe is the Founder and Chairman of The Family Office Association, a premier global peer network of single-family offices. Since 2007, he has cultivated a community of senior family office executives and principals representing some of the world’s wealthiest families, promoting education, shared-best practices, and co-investment opportunities. Under his leadership, TFOA has become a trusted forum for collaboration, market insight, and proprietary investment deal flow on a global scale. He also teaches an MBA class on “The Entrepreneurial Family Office” as an Adjunct Professor at Rice University and Southern Methodist University. Mr. Sharpe holds an M.A. from Cambridge University, an M.Phil. from Oxford University, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members, and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families: www.tfoa.info

Disclosures

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a peer network of single family offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All of the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

A Family Office Guide for Direct Investing via Independent Sponsors

Abstract

This whitepaper examines the growing trend of direct investing by family offices, particularly through partnerships with independent sponsors. As family offices seek to bypass the fee drag and limited control of traditional private equity funds, direct investing is increasingly being seen as a compelling alternative. We explore the mechanics of independent sponsor transactions, the pros and cons for family offices, some global trends, and key legal and governance considerations. Hopefully, by better understanding these dynamics, family offices will be able to make informed decisions to adjust their investment strategies and achieve their goals.

Introduction

The private equity landscape is seeing increasing involvement by family offices in direct investing. Several recent reports highlight this trend. For example, the North America Family Office Report (2024) by Campden Wealth and RBC suggests that 60% of family offices are involved in direct private equity investments, with many planning to increase their allocations. A recent survey by Bastiat Partners and Kharis Capital suggests half of family offices plan to undertake direct deals in the next two years. And, according to the Dentons Family Office Direct Investing Survey (2022), 63% of family offices engage in direct investments, with many others expressing interest in this approach. Lastly, a Citi Private Bank 2021 survey found that 76% of family offices had at least 10% of their portfolios in direct – signaling “a shift away from conventional methods” of commingled funds1.

Traditionally, family offices have relied on commingled funds, with blind-pool capital, managed by general partners, who charge annual management fees plus a carried interest – typically a 2% management fee, and 20% carried interest (“2 and 20”). However, dissatisfaction with these fees, for mediocre performing managers, coupled with a desire for greater control and alignment with investment objectives, has led many family offices to explore direct investing.

Direct investing allows family offices to invest directly in private companies, often in collaboration with independent sponsors — typically experienced dealmakers who source and structure transactions without a pre-existing fund. This model usually provides family offices with the opportunity to participate in investments on more favorable terms, with enhanced control over decision-making processes and the potential for higher returns.

This whitepaper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of direct investing through independent sponsors, highlighting its advantages, operational mechanics, and strategic considerations for family offices.

Evolution of Private Equity Models

The history of private equity can be traced to 1901, when J.P. Morgan—the man, not the institution—purchased Carnegie Steel Co. from Andrew Carnegie and Henry Phipps for $480 million. More recently, the private equity blind pool model pioneered by KKR, among others, in the mid-1970s has dominated the industry. In this model, limited partners (LPs) commit capital to blind-pool funds managed by general partners (GPs), who charge a management fee (typically 2% of committed capital) and carried interest (usually 20% of profits), typically above a preferred return hurdle. This structure provided LPs with access to private markets but came with limitations, including significant fees, a lack of control over investment decisions, and potential misalignment of interests. Family offices are increasingly turning to direct investing due to their growing scale and expertise, a preference for greater oversight and privacy in their investments, and frustrations with the traditional fund model’s lack of alignment. Conventional private equity funds often prioritize quick exits or fundraising objectives that conflict with the long-term goals of family capital. Through direct investments, whether independently or in collaboration with others, families can choose their target companies and actively manage their involvement. The rise of direct investing reflects a broader trend towards professionalization within the family office space, with private equity remaining a favored asset class (PwC, 2024).

Thus, motivated by the desire to reduce fees, gain more control, and invest in sectors aligned with their expertise, many family offices are choosing to invest directly in private companies. This shift is facilitated by the emergence of independent sponsors, who offer a flexible, deal-by-deal approach to private equity investing.

Independent Sponsors: Definition and Operation

Independent sponsors, also known as ‘fund-less sponsors’, are individuals or small teams with extensive experience in private equity or investment banking. Unlike traditional GPs, they do not manage a dedicated fund; instead, they identify investment opportunities, negotiate deals, and then raise capital from investors on a per-deal basis. The process typically involves the following steps:

  1. Deal Sourcing: Independent sponsors leverage their networks and industry knowledge to identify potential acquisition targets.
  2. Due Diligence and Negotiation: Upon identifying a target, the sponsor conducts preliminary due diligence and negotiates a Letter of Intent (LOI) with the seller.
  3. Capital Raising: After signing the LOI, the sponsor has a specified period to raise the necessary capital from investors, such as family offices, to complete the transaction.
  4. Closing and Management: If capital is successfully raised, the deal closes, and the sponsor, along with the investors, takes ownership of the company. The sponsor often plays an active role in overseeing the investment, such as serving on the board, while the company’s management team handles day-to-day operations.

The independent sponsor does not typically take an executive role in the acquired company – unlike a search fund entrepreneur – but rather oversees the investment as a board member. The company’s existing management is typically retained and often augmented with new talent to help grow the business.

Compensation for independent sponsors is structured to align their interests with those of the capital providers. Common components include:

  • Monitoring Fees: Typically, 3% to 5% of the company’s EBITDA, paid quarterly, to compensate the sponsor for ongoing management and oversight. This contrasts with traditional private equity funds, where management fees are charged to the fund regardless of portfolio company performance.
  • Carried Interest: A share of the equity gains, ranging from 10% to 30%, often tiered based on performance thresholds. This ensures that the sponsor benefits only after investors achieve a certain return.

This performance-based compensation model contrasts with the traditional “2 and 20” structure of private equity funds, where fees are charged on committed capital regardless of deployment. The independent sponsor model ties fees directly to the success of each deal, fostering a strong alignment with investors. Consider a simplified example: An independent sponsor sources a $50M enterprise value deal funded with $25M equity and $25M debt. A family office provides 100% of the equity, and the sponsor earns a 2% closing fee ($1.0M), rolling half into the deal. The independent sponsor also receives a $250K annual monitoring fee. After 5 years, the company sells for $100M. The family office receives its original $25M back, an 8% compound, preferred return (~$11.7M), and 80% of the remaining profits ($30.6M). The sponsor earns approximately $7.7M in carried interest, bringing their total to around $9.5M across fees and carry. A significant majority of the sponsor’s upside is closely tied to the deal’s performance—aligning interests closely with investor.2

According to McGuireWoods, the majority of independent sponsor deals take place in the lower middle market, with approximately three-quarters of transactions involving companies valued up to $75 million. Notably, over two-thirds of these deals involve firms with enterprise values below $50 million, a segment often bypassed by larger private equity players. These smaller enterprises, typically family- or founder-led with EBITDA under $10 million, pose unique challenges in due diligence and operations that major funds tend to sidestep. Independent sponsors who tackle the demanding tasks of identifying and enhancing these businesses can achieve substantial returns in a market segment that traditional private equity has largely ignored.

Evidence suggests that independent sponsors are increasingly involved in larger transactions. Holland & Knight reports that a growing number of these sponsors are handling middle-market deals, with company valuations typically between $100 million and $500 million. This trend highlights the growing sophistication of the independent sponsor framework and heightened trust from funding sources. For example, Global Endowment Management secured more than $450 million to finance independent sponsor-led deals, signaling robust institutional support for these larger-scale investments.3

This trend is further supported by the increasing number of independent sponsors in the USA, estimated at around 1,300, many of whom are leveraging their deal-by-deal track records to transition into traditional fund structures. The Wall Street Journal notes that Coalesce Capital secured $900M for its first fund and Agellus Capital raised $400M after securing an anchor investor early in the process. As independent sponsors continue to demonstrate their ability to source and close larger transactions, the model is steadily moving into the mainstream of middle market private equity.4

Potential Benefits for Family Offices

Independent sponsor transactions are commonly financed through networks comprising family offices, high-net-worth individuals, and dedicated investment funds. Current data indicates that family offices represent the primary source of capital for these deals.5

Direct investing through independent sponsors offers several key benefits to family offices:

  • Cost Efficiency: By avoiding the management fees and carried interest of traditional funds, family offices can retain more of the investment returns. This is particularly appealing given the high perceived costs associated with the traditional model, although these costs, while not borne directly, do still come out of the return to the investor.
  • Control and Flexibility: Family offices have more influence over investment decisions, including the selection of sectors, holding periods, and exit strategies. This allows them to align investments with their expertise and long-term goals.
  • Alignment of Interests: The partnership model ensures that the sponsor’s incentives are closely aligned with those of the family office, as both parties share in the success of the investment. Where the alignment is strongest is the management fee charged to the portfolio company based on performance rather than charged to LPs based on commitments.
  • Access to Niche Opportunities: Independent sponsors often focus on specific industries or deal sizes, providing family offices with access to unique investment opportunities that may not be available through traditional funds.

These benefits make direct investing an attractive option for family offices seeking to optimize their private equity portfolios. However, despite these advantages, direct investing is challenging for family offices, especially smaller ones. Doing direct deals requires capabilities in deal sourcing, due diligence, execution, and asset management that many family offices lack or are unwilling to build. Many family offices operate lean (a CIO and a few analysts) and cannot easily vet deals across various industries on tight timelines.

Global Trends in Direct Investing

The adoption of direct investing by family offices is a global phenomenon, with variations across different regions:6

Region # of SFO’s Key Trends
North America 3,180 83% engage in private equity, often through direct deals (Deloitte, 2024).
Europe 2,020 Cultural preference for direct ownership, leading to co-investments.
Asia-Pacific 2,290 Rapid growth, favoring growth equity and venture deals with local sponsors.
Middle East 290 Diversification from oil-based economies through direct investments.
  • North America: As the largest market for family offices, North America leads in direct investing, with significant assets under management (AUM) and a strong preference for private equity (Deloitte, 2024).
  • Europe: European family offices, driven by a cultural inclination towards direct ownership, increasingly participate in co-investments and partnerships with independent sponsors.
  • Asia-Pacific: The region is experiencing rapid growth in family offices, particularly in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, where there is a focus on growth equity and venture deals, often in collaboration with local sponsors or conglomerates.
  • Middle East: Emerging wealth hubs like Dubai and Abu Dhabi are attracting family offices seeking to diversify through direct investments in various sectors.

These regional differences highlight the adaptability of the direct investing model to diverse market conditions and investment preferences.

Governance and Operational Considerations

Engaging in direct investing requires family offices to navigate complex legal, governance, and operational landscapes. Unlike a commingled fund where an LP is hands-off, here the family office and sponsor effectively become business partners in a single-company investment. Key considerations include:

  • Partnership Agreements: Clear agreements with independent sponsors regarding fees, interest, governance rights, and operational roles are essential to ensure alignment and prevent conflicts.
  • Due Diligence: Family offices must conduct thorough due diligence on both the investment opportunity and the independent sponsor’s track record, expertise, and reputation.
  • Regulatory Compliance: Compliance with regional regulations, such as securities laws and tax implications, is crucial to avoid legal pitfalls.
  • Risk Management: Direct investments entail higher risks due to concentrated exposure; robust risk management frameworks are necessary to monitor and mitigate potential downsides.

Securing an appropriate partner presents significant challenges. Independent sponsors frequently find it difficult to establish connections with family offices, which often maintain a discreet presence and avoid prominent networking gatherings. Connections are typically facilitated through trusted intermediaries such as private bankers, lawyers, or investment advisors familiar with a family’s investment preferences. Family offices, when considering partnerships with independent sponsors, often express concerns about: the sponsor’s dedication (fearing a lack of commitment during challenging times), additional funding requirements (where reluctance to provide further capital can lead to conflicting priorities), and governance issues (with families typically seeking significant influence, such as board representation or veto powers, when providing the majority of capital).

Economic Comparison

Comparing the economics of traditional funds and direct investing models reveals significant differences:

Aspect Traditional PE Funds Direct Investing with Independent Sponsors
Fees7 2% management + 20% carry Negotiated per deal, typically lower
Control Limited for LPs High, with influence over decisions
Flexibility Fixed fund terms, forced exits Flexible holding periods and exit strategies
Tax Alignment Potential for phantom income Tailored structures for better tax outcomes

Direct investing allows family offices to tailor tax structures and focus on single-asset exposure, enhancing after-tax returns. However, it’s worth noting that the lines are not black-and-white. Some large family offices continue to invest in top-tier PE funds for diversification, while also carving out a portion for directs. And some independent sponsors effectively operate like small funds (doing multiple deals in parallel and even raising “search funds” or pledges to cover their costs). Conversely, some PE funds now offer separately managed accounts or coinvest funds to single investors, blurring into the direct model.

Challenges and Risk Mitigation

While direct investing offers numerous advantages, it also presents challenges that family offices must navigate:

  • Finding the Right Partner: Identifying and vetting independent sponsors with appropriate expertise and track record is crucial.
  • Building Trust: Establishing trust with sponsors under tight deal timelines can be difficult; thorough due diligence and clear communication are essential.
  • Resource Intensity: Direct investing requires significant time and resources for deal sourcing, due diligence, and ongoing management, which may strain smaller family offices.
  • Concentration Risk: Investing directly in single assets increases concentration risk compared to diversified fund investments.

To mitigate these risks, family offices can:

  • Develop In-House Expertise: Build a team with the necessary skills or partner with experienced advisors.
  • Establish Clear Criteria: Define investment criteria and partner selection processes to ensure alignment with strategic goals.
  • Diversify Investments: Spread investments across multiple deals and sectors to manage risk.
  • Implement Robust Governance: Set up strong governance structures to monitor investments and sponsor performance.

Implications for Stakeholders

The rise of direct investing impacts various stakeholders in the private equity ecosystem:

  • Limited Partners (LPs): Traditional LPs may need to build in-house capabilities for direct investing or seek better terms from GPs.
  • General Partners (GPs): GPs face increased competition from independent sponsors and may need to adjust their fee structures or offer more co-investment opportunities.
  • Deal Intermediaries: Investment bankers and advisors benefit from an expanded buyer pool but must adapt to the unique requirements of family offices and independent sponsors.
  • Founders and Management Teams: They gain access to flexible, long-term capital from investors who are often more aligned with their strategic vision. While they may be forced to accept longer sale processes and exclusivity periods, and take some risk of failure of financing, the benefit is a wider pool of buyers and most importantly the ability to align better when they are rolling equity (which is typical at this stage).

Conclusion

Direct investing through partnerships with independent sponsors represents a paradigm shift in how family offices approach private equity. By offering greater control, cost efficiency, and alignment of interests, this model enables family offices to optimize their investment strategies and achieve superior outcomes. At the same time, the line between independent sponsors and traditional GPs is being blurred by the emergence of hybrid structures and flexible capital strategies. Many first-time fund managers are simultaneously raising debut funds while deploying capital through co-investment pools, SPVs, pledge funds, or even permanent capital vehicles. These models blend the flexibility and performance orientation of deal-by-deal investing with the scalability of fund platforms. For investors, they may offer a dual benefit of more efficient, performance-tied fee structures and better tax alignment by linking recognition to actual distributions. As a result, the rigid GP/LP paradigm is giving way to a broader spectrum of capital deployment models—ranging from blind pools to single-asset partnerships—with family offices often leading the charge in adopting and shaping these innovations. In conclusion, while challenges exist, careful planning and execution can help family offices navigate the complexities and reap the rewards of direct investing. As the number of family offices continues to grow globally, those that embrace direct investing should be well-positioned to achieve their financial objectives and preserve wealth for future generations.

 

Notes

  1. The range — from 60% to 76% — quoted in these surveys reflects the lack of standardization around definitions and nomenclature within the family office world but directionally suggests that family offices are allocating significant capital to direct private equity opportunities.↩︎
  2. See Appendix A for step-by-step calculations.↩︎
  3. Holland & Knight. (2023). Independent Sponsors: Market Trends and Industry Insights.↩︎
  4. WSJ, “Private Equity Managers Persevere In Pitching First-Time Funds”↩︎
  5. In a 2023 survey, 63% of independent sponsor deals involved family office capital – the highest of any source. Other top sources included mezzanine funds (often providing equity co-invest alongside debt; involved in ~50% of deals) and high-net-worth individuals (~47%) (tiff.org). Note: this data cites occurrences rather than dollar volume, which may be lower for family offices versus institutional investors.↩︎
  6. Campden Wealth/RBC North America Family Office Report 2024.↩︎
  7. Traditional PE Funds typically charge 2% management fee on committed capital, charged to the fund, plus 20% carried interest, plus monitoring fees (3-5% of EBITDA) charged to the portfolio company. Independent sponsor fees are negotiated per deal and typically include monitoring fees (3-5% of EBITDA) charged to the portfolio company, plus 10-30% carried interest.↩︎

About the Author

Marc J. Sharpe is a global investment executive and board member with a distinguished career spanning family office management, private equity, venture capital, and investment banking. Known for his strategic insight, deep expertise in family office governance, and ability to foster innovation and value creation, Mr. Sharpe has built and led investment platforms that deliver sustainable growth while navigating complex financial and operational challenges. His leadership style emphasizes integrity, continuous improvement, and long-term partnerships that generate significant stakeholder value. Mr. Sharpe is the Founder and Chairman of The Family Office Association, a premier global peer network of single-family offices. Since 2007, he has cultivated a community of senior family office executives and principals representing some of the world’s wealthiest families, promoting education, shared-best practices, and co-investment opportunities. Under his leadership, TFOA has become a trusted forum for collaboration, market insight, and proprietary investment deal flow on a global scale. He also teaches an MBA class on “The Entrepreneurial Family Office” as an Adjunct Professor at Rice University and Southern Methodist University. Mr. Sharpe holds an M.A. from Cambridge University, an M.Phil. from Oxford University, and an MBA from Harvard Business School. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families: www.tfoa.info

 

Appendix A

To calculate the preferred return and related financial outcomes for the given private equity deal example, let’s break it down step by step based on the provided information below.

Key Details:

  • Enterprise Value (EV): $50 million
  • Equity Contribution: $25 million (provided by the family office)
  • Debt: $25 million
  • Closing Fee: 2% of $50 million = $1.0 million (sponsor rolls half, $0.5 million, into the deal)
  • Monitoring Fee: $250,000 per year
  • Holding Period: 5 years
  • Exit Value: $100 million
  • Preferred return: 8% per year, compounding annually
  • Profit split: Family office receives 80% of remaining profits, sponsor receives 20% as carried interest

Step-by-Step Calculations:

#1. Preferred Return Calculation:

The preferred return is an 8% annual return, compounded annually, on the family office’s $25 million equity investment over 5 years using the formula: A = P * (1 + r) n – P

  • P = 25,000,000 (initial equity investment)
  • r = 0.08 (annual preferred return rate)
  • n = 5 (years)
  • Calculate (1.08)^5 = ~1.469328
  • Total amount including principal: 25,000,000 * 1.469328 = 36,733,200
  • Preferred return: 36,733,200 – 25,000,000 = 11,733,200

#2. Total Return to Family Office (Capital + Preferred Return):

Family office receives its initial $25 million equity back plus the preferred return: 25,000,000 + 11,733,200 = 36,733,200

#3. Exit Proceeds and Remaining Profits:

  • Exit Value: $100 million
  • Debt Repayment: $25 million
  • Equity Value at Exit: $100 million – $25 million = $75 million
  • Remaining Profits after family office receives capital + preferred return: 75,000,000 – 36,733,200 = 38,266,800

#4. Profit Split:

  • Family Office (80%): 38,266,800 * 0.8 = 30,613,440
  • Sponsor Carried Interest (20%): 38,266,800 * 0.2 = 7,653,360

#5. Sponsor’s Total Compensation:

  • Closing Fee: $1.0 million (half rolled into the deal, so cash received = $0.5 million)
  • Monitoring Fees: $250,000/year × 5 years = $1.25 million
  • Carried Interest: ~$7.65 million
  • Total Sponsor Compensation: 0.5 + 1.25 + 7.65 = 9.45

#6. Family Office Total Return:

  • Capital Returned: $25 million
  • Preferred Return: ~$11.73 million
  • Profit Share: ~$30.61 million
  • Total: 25 + 11.73 + 30.61 = 67.34

 

Bibliography

  • Deloitte. (2024). Global Family Office Report.
  • Dentons. (2022). Family Office Direct Investing Survey.
  • PwC. (2024). Global Family Office Deals Study.
  • UBS. (2024). Global Family Office Report.
  • Woolery & Co. (2025). Direct Investing and Independent Sponsors in Private Equity.

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Disclosures

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a peer network of single family offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All of the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

Private Debt Secondaries

Private Debt Secondaries: Beyond GP/ LP Transactions into the World of Liquidity Management

As one of the fastest-growing areas of the private markets, the attractiveness of private debt as an asset class is broadly recognized. Its’ defined duration, low volatility, and limited drawdown risk relative to other alternatives is often desirable, particularly when considered with empirically stable returns.1 As such, a natural evolution of a maturing primary market is developing volume in secondaries transactions.

Private debt secondaries (PDS) have prospered in recent years, providing liquidity to investors in a putatively illiquid asset class. Investment managers have responded—raising dedicated secondary funds and partnering with strategic players. In recent years, we have experienced the secondary market bloom from a nascent opaque market, focused initially on bilateral transactions and purchases of LP interests by private equity secondaries funds at steep discounts. Following Covid, the market transformed, and the associated dislocation has brought opportunities.

In 2022, substantial challenges in the liquid markets exacerbated the so-called denominator effect, leading institutional investors to be overweight several illiquid asset classes. Counterintuitively, the relatively strong performance of private debt meant that accepting a haircut on those valuations would require a comparatively modest markdown (particularly against devalued fixed income and equity holdings), and thus transactional volume arrived, reaching $17 billion in 2022 (more than 30x larger than 2012 levels), per Coller Capital.2 Savvy family offices and other institutions became buyers of performing direct lending LP interests at prices reflective of private equity returns.

Relative “Haircuts” When Markets Head South

Secondaries volumes in 2022 were down across all asset classes, except for private debt, where volumes increased by 30.3%.3 Investors utilized the secondary market for reasons varying from strategic redirection to rebalancing due to portfolio limitations and portfolio optimization. Investors sold private debt exposure because valuations remained stable relative to the public market (both debt and equity) and other private market asset classes.

Figure 1 illustrates this point: The 2022 price decline in buyouts was more pronounced than in private debt. Notably, there is large price variance from the average prices listed below and the type of private debt strategy is influential to pricing; in 2022, senior lending funds priced in the low 90s, mezzanine strategies in the 80s and distressed/special sits in the high 70s. Compared with private equity discounts, which range from 15–25% during dislocations, private debt can offer an attractive alternative.

Discounts Matter, But Not as Much as One Would Think….

Price bands are important but insufficient to determine returns on their own. Consider that direct loans have an average economic life of 3 years (4 years in the current environment)4. Against a less liquid private equity portfolio, the distribution profile should be more condensed and predictable.

  • Thus, price may vary greatly depending on the stage in the fund term and corresponding drawn and undrawn commitments, its current yield and any expected refinancings in the portfolio.
  • In addition, historical loss rates must be considered and flexed for manager particulars such as concentration and industry exposure.
  • Finally, transaction dynamics come into play, including approved buyer lists, speed of execution and any “stapled” primary investment requests attached to a current manager fund. There may be an amount of book building by the broker due to varying demand for specific funds and available ticket sizes.

This profusion of factors affects bid-ask spreads, but ultimately pricing is only one variable. In short, discounts matter but not as much as you might think!

PDS Market Formation

With a plethora of opportunities and an advantageous supply-demand imbalance, dedicated PDS investors stepped into the market in 2022, armed with lower cost of capital, the ability to apply portfolio leverage (at the investing entity), transaction leverage (through deferred payments), and alternative views on loss rates and cashflow modeling. For these investors, capital at work is as important as IRR and TVPI. Therefore, their desired outcome differs from your stereotypical private equity secondary buyers. So do their target returns: Over 50% of buyers seek a net IRR/TVPI below 12.5%/1.5x.5 This market intervention is a positive secular change for existing private debt investors in need of liquidity.

The term private debt covers an array of vastly different sub-strategies, some of which are covered in Figure 2. The market is in fact more disparate, with many more sub-strategies. Having broad coverage and asset class expertise is required to cover the universe.

Vetting broadly diversified direct lending portfolios requires in-depth market data and views on repayment speeds and expected loss rates. Conversely, concentrated distressed portfolios require familiarity with each company and line-item equity-style underwriting. The ability to accurately forecast returns across multiple strategies allows secondary buyers to provide broader and encompassing liquidity solutions. Market coverage is paramount.

Financial Innovation and Bespoke Liquidity Management Techniques

The PDS market may be in its infancy but innovative financing solutions from the private equity market are already being implemented.

  • NAV-Financing is a broad term for financing underpinned by a diversified portfolio, which can contain private equity companies, real estate assets or even private debt funds. The portfolio’s NAV is used as collateral for the loan, generating liquidity for the GP or LP while retaining the future upside from the original portfolio exposure. Realizations in the underlying portfolio are used to fund the repayments of the NAV facility. This product is established in the private equity and real estate markets, but only recently adopted in the private debt secondary market as an alternative to secondary sales.
  • Collateralized Fund Obligations (CFOs) have similar goals to secondaries, i.e., to enhance liquidity for GPs and LPs. CFOs are securities that create leveraged exposure to a portfolio of fund investments through the issuance of an equity tranche and one or more debt tranches. Think: CLOs with funds replacing the underlying loans.

For sellers, structured solutions may be preferable to a secondary sale in order to generate liquidity. Investors can maintain exposure to private debt while generating interim liquidity to rebalance their portfolios. Secondary investors are attracted to this investment style, as it meets the desired returns with a relatively attractive risk profile. With private equity secondaries, buyers and sellers often have differing views on the future valuations and potential upside of the assets. Since upside is relatively limited for private debt, differences of opinion tend to be narrower and more focused on repayment speeds and loss rates. When both parties’ views on future valuations are aligned, the variance in pricing is much lower and a structured solution which accommodates both parties’ requirements is often optimal.

PDS—The Flywheel Effect

In 2022, private debt represented only 4% of the total secondary market.6 As the asset class matures, we expect this share to expand. We suggest the continued growth and effectiveness of the private debt secondaries market will open private debt to a new investor cohort that previously had concerns about liquidity, term, or liability mismatches.

Conclusion

The private debt market is forecast to continue its growth due to its attractive yields throughout credit cycles, low volatility, limited drawdowns, and relatively high risk-adjusted returns. By that same token, volume in its secondary market is expected to increase. Family offices and institutional investors are supporting this growth in both the primary and secondary markets. We have observed LPs making tactical sales of relatively stable private debt portfolios, without exiting the private debt market entirely. We also observe several other important value drivers, in addition to discount emerging. Furthermore, activity has moved beyond traditional secondaries and into the more bespoke world of liquidity management through financial innovation.

By providing innovative liquidity solutions, Family offices and institutional investors are improving asset class accessibility to a new investor base. Now investors can confidently enter the private debt market and avail themselves of its illiquidity premium with the comfort that there will be liquidity if they seek to rebalance. Furthermore, due to the illiquidity of private debt and its corresponding valuations, investors can often transact at relatively attractive prices. As the PDS market matures, structured solutions will develop. Traditional secondary sales, while prevalent in the current market, may only cater to a certain investor group; investors in need of interim liquidity may prefer alternative financing solutions.

 

About the Authors

Marc J. Sharpe is the founder and Chairman of TFOA, an organization formed in 2007 to provide a forum for education and networking and to serve as a resource for single family office principals and professionals to share ideas and best practices, pool buying power, leverage talent and conduct due diligence. Mr. Sharpe also teaches an MBA class on “The Entrepreneurial Family Office” as an Adjunct Professor at SMU Cox School of Business: Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families.

About StepStone

StepStone Group Inc. is a global private markets investment firm focused on providing customized investment solutions and advisory, data and administrative services to its clients. StepStone partners with its clients, including sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies, prominent endowments, foundations, family offices and private wealth clients, to develop and build private markets portfolios designed to meet their specific objectives across the private equity, infrastructure, private debt and real estate asset classes.

Notes

  1. StepStone Group. 2023. “Relative Attractiveness of Direct Lending: Liquidity, Volatility and Drawdowns.”↩︎
  2. Claire Coe Smith. 2023. “Private Debt Secondaries: Macro disruption generates momentum,” Private Debt Investor, 2 May.↩︎
  3. Setter Capital. 2022. “Volume Report FY 2022.”↩︎
  4. Cliffwater. 2023. “2022 Q4 Report on U.S. Direct Lending”↩︎
  5. Campbell Luytens. 2022. “Secondary Market Overview.”↩︎
  6. Campbell Luytens. 2022. “Secondary Market Overview.”↩︎

StepStone Disclosures

This document is for information purposes only and has been compiled with publicly available information. StepStone makes no guarantees of the accuracy of the information provided. This information is for the use of StepStone’s clients and contacts only. This report is only provided for informational purposes. This report may include information that is based, in part or in full, on assumptions, models and/or other analysis (not all of which may be described herein). StepStone makes no representation or warranty as to the reasonableness of such assumptions, models or analysis or the conclusions drawn. Any opinions expressed herein are current opinions as of the date hereof and are subject to change at any time. StepStone is not intending to provide investment, tax or other advice to you or any other party, and no information in this document is to be relied upon for the purpose of making or communicating investments or other decisions. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed in this report constitutes a solicitation, an offer, or a recommendation to buy, sell or dispose of any investment, to engage in any other transaction or to provide any investment advice or service.

Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Actual results may vary.

On September 20, 2021, StepStone Group Inc. acquired Greenspring Associates, Inc. (“Greenspring”). Upon the completion of this acquisition, the management agreement of each Greenspring vehicle was assigned to StepStone Group LP. Each of StepStone Group LP, StepStone Group Real Assets LP, StepStone Group Real Estate LP and StepStone Group Private Wealth LLC is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). StepStone Group Europe LLP is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, firm reference number 551580. StepStone Group Europe Alternative Investments Limited (“SGEAIL”) is an SEC Registered Investment Advisor and an Alternative Investment Fund Manager authorized by the Central Bank of Ireland and Swiss Capital Alternative Investments AG (“SCAI”) is an SEC Exempt Reporting Adviser and is licensed in Switzerland as an Asset Manager for Collective Investment Schemes by the Swiss Financial Markets Authority FINMA. Such registrations do not imply a certain level of skill or training and no inference to the contrary should be made.

In relation to Switzerland only, this document may qualify as “advertising” in terms of Art. 68 of the Swiss Financial Services Act (FinSA). To the extent that financial instruments mentioned herein are offered to investors by SCAI, the prospectus/offering document and key information document (if applicable) of such financial instrument(s) can be obtained free of charge from SCAI or from the GP or investment manager of the relevant collective investment scheme(s). Further information about SCAI is available in the SCAI Information Booklet which is available from SCAI free of charge. Manager references herein are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute investment recommendations.

Source:  StepStone Group LP. The information contained herein is © 2023 by StepStone Group LP.

 

Disclosures

TFOA is a peer network of Single Family Offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Texas Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All of the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

Why Venture Backed Immigrant Founders Succeed

Executive Summary

Immigrant entrepreneurs outperform in founding U.S. unicorns and Fortune 500 companies, creating patents and jobs, and powering innovation in the U.S. economy. This white paper reviews findings from research to demonstrate the success of immigrant innovators and entrepreneurs and explore the reason(s) for their success, including the networking advantage they bring through the companies they lead that specialize in global markets at conception affording these firms a greater chance to succeed and scale.

Key Stats

  • 55% of unicorns (billion-dollar startups) have at least one immigrant cofounder. National foundation for American Policy (2018).
  • 43% of Fortune 500 firms in 2017 and 57% of the top 35 firms were founded by immigrants and their children. Center for American Entrepreneurship (2022).
  • 35% of U.S innovation and entrepreneurship is created by immigrants accounting for 13.7% of the U.S. population. (Kerr & Kerr, 2020; Budiman, A. 2020).
  • 20% of the world’s tech founders are immigrants, while they only make up about 4% of the world’s population. The Global Startup Ecosystem Report by Startup Genome (2022).

Unicorns and Outliers

What do SpaceX, Zoom, Wish, Robinhood, Stripe, Uber, DoorDash, InstaCart, and Pfizer have in common? Each one is a U.S. unicorn (i.e., a privately held company with a valuation of over 1 billion dollars) and each one was founded by immigrants. The overwhelming majority of unicorns are tech startups supported by venture capital funding which has generated tremendous returns for their investors.

The overwhelming majority of unicorns are tech startups supported by venture capital funding. Collectively, the VC industry in tech has generated tremendous returns for its investors. Broad research exists on the various factors that drive the success of unicorn companies. Among these are the number of founders, the time required to achieve unicorn status, the variety of industries, and the characteristics of founders.

Unexpectedly, 55% of U.S unicorns studied had at least one immigrant founder (Anderson, 2022). This finding echoes the disproportional success rate among Fortune 500 companies, of which 45% were founded by first- and second-generation immigrants.

Ilya Strebulaev, a tenured professor with the Stanford Graduate School of Business and head of the Venture Capital Initiative, a research group chartered to keep tabs on entrepreneurship, private equity investments, and the impact of venture capital on business, using recent data, has discovered a series of revealing correlations between venture funding, immigrants, and success.

Based on the research of 1,123 U.S based unicorns with some VC backing, start-ups with 3 or 4 immigrant co-founders were a whopping 74% more likely to reach unicorn status. Interestingly, Dr. Strebulaev’s highly representative sample indicates a series of significant correlations between immigrants, their education, their success in corporate leadership, and their success as founders.

Immigrants Outperform in Entrepreneurship and Innovation

Immigrants’ success in entrepreneurship extends beyond unicorn companies. Between the years 2008 and 2012, immigrants founded 25% of all new businesses (Krol 2021; Kerr and Kerr 2020). When compared to their native-born counterparts, immigrants are 80% more likely to register a business (Dizikes, 2022). Based on 2017 data from Fortune 500 companies, as well as the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database, which included information on every new business founded between 2005 and 2010 that lasted at least five years, for a total of 1.02 million firms, immigrants are more likely to found firms (of all sizes) than native-born entrepreneurs.

Immigrants’ rate of innovation is also much high than their native-born counterparts. Immigrants account for nearly 1 in 4 U.S. patents, despite constituting only about 14% of the population overall (Azoulay, 2020). From 1975 to 2015, immigrants as a group attained 40% more patents on average compared to all other groups in proportion to their steadily growing percentage of the U.S. population.

Data collected from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Stanford researchers note that the higher number of patents secured by immigrants are in greater use in industry and research. Researchers found that immigrant-originated patents were 40% more likely to be publicly recognized or currently in use. The total speculated economic value of these innovations occurring chiefly through the utilization of patents by public companies is estimated to constitute 25% of economic value, or 50% higher than the overall average (Tam, 2020). Research from the CATO Institute indicates that immigrants are largely the originators of innovation and economic dynamism, rather than the supporters. Data collected from 1975 to 2010 notes that immigrants flowing into the U.S can be tied to a 27% increase in patent acquisition and an increase in regional wages (Burchardi et al., 2020).

Tech Leadership

Data on immigrant founders shows that they have taken on a disproportionately large role in management, product development, and have led several sectors in overall patent attainment. Exclusive use rights have provided their firms with access to new methods integral to emerging product designs. Anderson notes that as of 2016, over 70% of companies involved the contribution of one or more immigrants in a key role in management or product development. As of 2022, nearly 80% of U.S. unicorns have an immigrant founder or an immigrant in a key leadership position.

Notable examples include SpaceX, Uber, and over 30 others. Self-selection bias may be at play given the proportionally higher numbers of immigrant STEM holders. The discrepancy between lower absolute education in the immigrant population and increased numbers of those with STEM expertise is likely the result of a U-shaped skills curve within the immigrant population (Krol, 2021; Ganguli et al., 2020).

Jobs and Value Creation

Contrary to the usual narrative, immigrants create more jobs than native-born entrepreneurs, accordingly to Ben Jones, a professor of strategy at Kellogg. Immigrant-founded companies not only have more patents than native-born-founder-led firms, but they also pay higher wages than native-founded firms. Immigrants are found to be economically compliments in the multiple sectors in which they participate; these groups have been recognized as generators of roughly 25% of American jobs. NFAP finds that privately held U.S. billion-dollar startup companies with immigrant founders have created an average of 859 jobs per company. Thus, immigrants improve the economic outcomes for native-born workers. Immigrant-founded US unicorns are collectively worth $1.2 trillion and would be the 16th largest GDP as a country, more than the value of the companies listed on the major stock markets of most countries.

Self-Selection and Resilience

Many reasons can contribute to immigrant success as startup founders and corporate leaders. Peter Vandor (2021) notes in his Harvard Business Review article that the combination of a high appetite for risk, high achievement motivation, and follow-through are qualities supported by survey data as consistent with a business leader identified as an immigrant.

The ways in which the immigration process leads to a kind of self-selection bias may also be a key contributing factor. Cost, complications, and stringent requirements notwithstanding, the selection involved in F1 and H-1B visa attainment present an often-insurmountable challenge for many prospective immigrants. Given these limits, immigrants who successfully acquire visas and citizenship status exhibit a characteristically uncommon tolerance for risk and adaptability to unfamiliar circumstances.

Research performed by the Vienna University of Economics and Business found that nearly half of students who indicated an interest in starting a business and who also chose to move abroad and return later created a business (Gaskell, 2021). Additional obstructions like labor market discrimination compound these effects.

Nearly 25% of U.S. billion-dollar startup firms have a founder who was once an international student (Anderson, 2022). Standards for admission as an international student are considerably higher than average. Furthermore, international students typically seek out universities with high ranking and better outcomes. This historical data review records in years before 2020 indicating that successes were not influenced by recent or intentional changes.

Education

Successful firms in emerging industries like tech need technically astute talent. Although international students only account for 4% of the U.S. university population, they obtained 50% of the graduate degrees in STEM. Immigrants are 40% more likely to hold a doctorate, according to Tam (2020). And immigrants are the majority recipients of higher-level STEM degrees. NFAP found that in 2011, 65% of Ph.D. recipients and 60% of master’s degree students in electric engineering were foreign-born. Similar results appear in fields like computer science, mathematics, and statistics (Anderson, 2013).

The most current data confirm the value of education to financial outcomes led by immigrants vetted through the emigration process. Illya Stebulaeve (2022) found that 21% of these founders were educated, at least in part, in one U.S university. Universities such as the University of Waterloo and Tel Aviv University have developed immigrants who originated at least 26 unicorns. NFAP also found that 25% of billion-dollar startup companies in the U.S. have a founder who attended a U.S. university as an international student.

Among all the immigrant founders of U.S. unicorns, 174 international students became founders or cofounders. International students typically can only remain in the United States long-term after gaining H-1B status and (or) an employment-based green card. Those who have been granted a continuous stay lead these firms.

To be Born Global

Vendor (2021) from the Harvard Business Review quotes “immigrant founders have a competitive advantage when it comes to building impactful, global reaching ventures.” Such firms have a global market strategy at inception. These firms’ leadership is more often than not made up of immigrants with diverse backgrounds and competencies relevant to the tech industry.

Simply put, these global reaching ventures are birthed with international orientation by talent originating globally. Their founding teams come from within rather than expand into international markets. Strategic choices made typically mirror the capacities and interests of firm managers who leverage global connections for market access and innovation. These companies leverage local and global ecosystems for innovation and talent acquisition generating a truly unique, difficult to replicate business model. Research indicates that such firm’s success leans heavily on the networking abilities of its founder(s), the globally scalable product, and of course adequate funding (Gabrielsson et al., 2008).

This networking edge has been demonstrated to improve their firms’ chances of success during the take-off early stages of development while positioning them for potentially exponential growth at middle stage and late-stage development. This networking effect lends a competitive advantage due to knowledge generated about the global environment, access to market information, and access to the best products and developers.

Conclusion

The pace at which VC-backed firms achieve billion-dollar valuations is accelerating. In the past 10 years, the number of U.S unicorns has doubled. In the past 5 years, the number of U.S. unicorns went up 500%. For tech startups, global scale companies led by immigrant founders continue to demonstrate real competitive advantages in achieving higher success rates and bringing great returns for investors. This is especially true during times of uncertainty and disruption, given their resilience.

References

Additional Resources

About the Author

Marc J. Sharpe is the founder and Chairman of TFOA, an organization formed in 2007 to provide a forum for education and networking and to serve as a resource for single family office principals and professionals to share ideas and best practices, pool buying power, leverage talent and conduct due diligence. Mr. Sharpe is active in the community and has served on the Board of the Holocaust Museum Houston, the HBS Houston Angels, and on the Investment Committee for two Texas based foundations. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members, and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families: www.tfoa.info

Disclosures

TFOA is a peer network of Single Family Offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Texas Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

Family Offices Should Fight the Urge to Cut Back on Small Buyouts

As inflation rages, and central banks raise policy rates, concerns about the health of the economy have been front of mind for investors. Although the US has so far managed to avoid a recession, many consumers and investors are now hunkering down.

When the economy shrinks, consumers typically respond by paying down debt, saving more, and spending less on nonessential goods. Institutions, on the other hand, try to adjust the “tilts” of their portfolios. They increase their allocations to defensive assets like real assets and private debt, and seek ‘safety’ with larger, more familiar private equity fund managers. Necessarily, this comes at the expense of small, emerging, and diverse managers, which some regard as riskier than their larger, “more proven” counterparts (Figure 1).

The institutions that reduce their allocations to private equity’s small market managers during turbulent markets treat this tranche of the buyout market as a luxury good, something that is consumed when the economy is booming.

Instead, we believe investors should consider it a staple that can bolster and diversify their portfolios regardless of the macroeconomic backdrop.

As global investors contemplate their 2023 budgets and allocation targets, they should resist the temptation to pull back on small-market buyouts. Contrary to what LP actions would imply, now is the time to lean in on the low(er) end.

Why Now May Be the Time to Lean In

The segment of the market we refer to as small-market buyouts (“SBO”) consists of private equity GPs that raise funds smaller than US$1 billion while investing in companies with a total enterprise value (TEV) of US$250 million or less. Although there are several benefits to investing in SBO, we have chosen to highlight the ones that are most salient to current market conditions.

Vast Opportunity Set yet Underallocated

The SBO market is the largest and most dispersed tranche of the buyout market. In the US, which has the largest and most mature SBO market, it is significantly larger than the middle and large markets combined based on number of companies (Figure 2). In fact, the small market is home to nearly 90% of private companies in the US yet represents only a fifth of the capital raised.

Family Offices’ propensity to cut back on SBO during downturns means there will be even less capital chasing the segment.

As seen in Figure 3, SBO dry powder has increased modestly compared with other strategies, growing at a CAGR of 3% between 2016 and 2021. While the trend lines for each have been up and to the right across the entire buyout market for many years, SBO has been most insulated from this frothiness.

Greater Focus

Most SBO funds target businesses with less than US$25 million of EBITDA, (Figure 4). Businesses of this size are less likely to be represented by sophisticated intermediaries (if they are represented at all), enabling SBO managers to source investments in a less competitive environment. By sourcing directly, SBO firms generate value from price inefficiencies, improved asset selection, and greater awareness of the true operational value-add potential of a business.

Less Leverage

As seen in Figure 5, which illustrates leverage multiples for various tranches of the buyout market, small-market companies have used considerably less leverage than their larger counterparts. Because they have less debt to pay down, small-market companies have more free cash flow to reinvest in their businesses.

Multiple Expansion

Historically, purchase price multiples have been much lower for small-market companies (Figure 6). And while the low-interest- rate environment that has characterized the past 15-plus years has allowed valuations to increase for all assets, entry multiples for small-market companies have risen more modestly.

Low entry multiples and a greater capacity for operational improvements create ideal conditions for multiple expansion. Harkening back to Figure 3, ample dry powder, particularly upmarket, suggests the pool of potential buyers is well funded.

“Home Run” Potential

Large sponsor interest in high-quality assets that can serve as a platform for consolidation of high-growth or fragmented sectors can lead to home run deals. Of the 387 realized North American buyout deals tracked for his whitepaper that have generated a 10x outcome or better, 77% were in SBO funds (Figure 7).

While multiple expansion can certainly boost an outcome from good to great, it’s not required to generate strong returns given the other value creation levers available in the small market.

In response to questions around the sustainability of multiple expansion as a source of return, one should ponder the impact on both existing and new deals. While the range of potential multiple expansion may compress on existing deals, valuations for new deals have also compressed, providing the same opportunity for multiple expansion in the future. Simply put, multiple expansion is a feature of the valuation environment and competition (read: dry powder) at different segments of the buyout market, which we believe positions SBO well for the foreseeable future.

Sensitivity to Public Market Volatility

Adding private markets to a traditional portfolio provides exposure to assets that may be underrepresented in listed markets. Over the past 30 years, the size and composition of listed markets have changed markedly. As seen in Figure 8, the number of public companies has fallen by half. At the same time, the average market cap has grown markedly, suggesting the number of public micro- and small-cap companies has fallen as well. Investors building well-rounded portfolios are therefore looking increasingly to the private markets to gain small-cap exposure. Moreover, because small-market companies are underrepresented in stock markets, they are less sensitive to swings in the stock market than larger companies.

To get a sense of just how sensitive, we compared the peak-to- trough performance of mega, large, middle and SBO funds with the public markets’ during three crash and recovery cycles: the dot-com bubble, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and Covid-19. We refer to this analysis as upside/downside capture.1

Figure 9 illustrates the market capture during the GFC. As you can see, SBO valuations rose 13.7%, capturing 91% of the gains in the public markets, on average. By contrast, mid, large, and mega fund valuations rose by 15.2%, in line with the public benchmarks. However, upside is only half of the picture. To get a sense of how the two tranches performed during the entire cycle, we also examined the downside. From their peak at the end of September 2007, SBO valuations fell by 12.6%, roughly 75% less than either public benchmark. Mid, large and mega fund valuations, by contrast, fell by more than one- third, capturing closer to 70% of public market downside. These results were consistent across all three cycles. On average, we found that SBO captured 30% of market downside and 94% of upside. This seems to run contrary to the popular assumption that SBO is riskier than other buyout strategies. How can this be?

Several factors may explain why small-market funds are less sensitive to fluctuations in equity markets.

  1. Because the preponderance of small-market companies are privately held, there are fewer comps in the public markets.
  2. SBO funds are generally more conservative in marking up businesses despite mark-to-market accounting. Mega and large buyout funds are more visible (some GPs even public themselves) and possibly held to more stringent accounting standards.
  3. Large buyout managers tend to come back to market sooner, often raising capital for alternative strategies or products or both. Therefore, interim returns matter. This speaks more to upside capture.
  4. SBO funds depend more on carry than management fees, which are calculated from a smaller basis. Small-market managers generally care more about exits than interim marks.

SBO Can Offer Great Access to Diverse Buyout Managers

We define a diverse fund as one that passes the “33% test.”2 Of the 1,400-plus North American buyout managers tracked by SPI,3 128 have raised a fund that passes this test. SBO managers account for 100 of them. As seen in Figure 10, diverse managers not only skew smaller but younger as well. Nearly three-quarters of diverse-managed private equity funds are new or emerging, and 90% are smaller than US$1 billion.4

A substantial body of work examining the effect diversity has on decision-making, organizational health and investment performance has emerged. For example, A 2021 study by the National Association of Investment Companies found that diverse private equity funds beat the Burgiss median across several key performance indicators: net IRR, MOIC and DPI.5

We have observed similar outcomes in our diverse manager track record (Figure 11).

  • For primary buyout and growth equity funds, diverse managers’ net TVM of 1.6x outperforms the benchmark median of 1.49x over the same vintages.6
  • This outperformance has been concentrated in the lower end of the market, where funds raising less than US$2 billion have generated a net TVM of 1.8x.

Notwithstanding these impressive returns, Family Offices have historically underweighted SBO where 90% of diverse talent exists. That said, the number and share of diverse funds has been increasing (Figure 12).

Though promising, it all feels a bit too frail. Unless Family Offices back enough of them, and diverse GPs consistently deliver competitive returns, few will survive, let alone graduate. Until that happens, SBO is buyout investors’ best / only realistic choice.

Challenges & Solutions

For all its benefits, SBO can present Family Offices with some challenges. It has more managers than any other segment of the buyout market. That many of these GPs are new or emerging means there are a lot of unproven teams and track records to decipher. Moreover, the difference between first- and fourth-quartile managers is widest for SBO.

The importance of manager selection is a common refrain in private markets. Within buyouts, this axiom rings truest for SBO funds, which have exhibited the highest and lowest return potential relative to other tranches (Figure 13).

Not only are the inter-quartile spreads widest for SBO, but they also have the widest average “intra-quartile” spreads.

When comparing SBO managers, quartile may be too coarse a measure; Family Offices and their advisors might consider thinking in terms of deciles.

Unless a family office has significant resources in-house, attempting to cover the small market can feel like a tall order, and they might feel tempted to default to brand-name managers. But is it worth it to try?

Incremental Effort

To help family offices determine whether they should attempt to dedicate resources toward SBOs, we compared the hypothetical spread of performance one might expect from assembling portfolios of either brand-name or SBO funds.

We examined buyout funds raised between 1985 and 2021. We defined brand-name funds as those whose fund sizes were in the top tercile (67th percentile) for a given vintage; SBO funds as those whose fund sizes were in the bottom tercile (33rd percentile). We created 100 portfolios made up of 10 funds by randomly selecting five of each fund type. To approximate hypothetical median performance—and avoid overweighting a good vintage or a poor fund—we also equally weighted vintages as well as commitments in each. We measured hypothetical performance across three dimensions: IRR, Direct Alpha, and Kaplan Schoar PME. The hypothetical results are summarized in Figure 14.7

To help answer our question, we calculated the standard deviation (σ) of each measure. Harkening back to SBO’s return dispersion, it should come as no surprise that SBO had a higher σ. But this wide distribution isn’t necessarily bad: We found that a 1σ increase in SBO’s IRR is roughly equivalent to a 1.3σ increase in brand names.8 In other words, the marginal return on effort is higher for SBO.

Think of this as an optimization exercise. In a world of limited time and money, we must choose how to spend either. Suppose a family office CIO must choose between randomly selecting one type of fund and spending resources vetting another. Clearly, they should randomly pick from the pool of brand- name managers where the marginal returns of climbing to the next decile are lower, and the risks of picking poorly are less pronounced. In assembling an SBO portfolio, a CIO needn’t even aim for the top quartile; if they can get to the 40th percentile, their time and energy will have been well spent.

Conclusion

As Family Offices ponder the composition of their portfolios for 2023, they may feel tempted to flock to familiar managers at the upper end of the market. Based on the data, we would say: Fight the urge! We believe now is the time to lean in to SBO. Less competition, attractive entry valuations, lower leverage, dry powder upmarket, multiple arbitrage, and a low correlation with stock market volatility are several reasons why. Regardless of market cycles, SBO can play a central role in an family office’s portfolio, complementing other private equity strategies by providing alternative return drivers and diversification benefits. Moreover, cutting back on SBO disproportionately affects capital going to diverse and emerging managers. However family offices choose to proceed, we believe investing in SBO to be well worth the effort. And there’s no better time than now.

Appendix A | Peak-to-Trough Performance

 

Appendix B | Hypothetical Results

Notes

  1. Downside is defined as the maximum drawdown between the peak and trough during a crisis; upside is the annualized return between the trough of the previous crisis and the peak of the next crisis. Dot-com peak March 31, 2000, trough September 30, 2002; GFC peak September 30, 2007, trough March 31, 2009; Covid peak December 31, 2019, trough March 31, 2020; post-Covid peak September 30, 2021.↩︎
  2. In our view, to be diverse, funds must pass at least one of the following tests: One-third of ownership counts as diverse; one-third of carry goes to diverse individuals; or one-third of individuals covered by a fund’s key-person clause are diverse.↩︎
  3. As of September 30, 2022. StepStone Private Markets Intelligence, Stepstone’s proprietary research library, garnered data on more than 15,000 GPs, 40,000 funds and 180,000 investments.↩︎
  4. We define new managers as those raising a Fund I; emerging managers as those raising Funds II–III.↩︎
  5. National Association of Investment Companies. 2021. “Examining the Returns 2021: The Financial Returns of Diverse Private Equity Firms.”↩︎
  6. StepStone Portfolio Analytics & Reporting. 2022. Omni Fund Benchmark, June 30.↩︎
  7. The following model is entirely hypothetical and an illustration of returns that could be earned if the assumptions specified above occurred. Investors are advised that actual returns could vary significantly from those shown herein. Any return contained herein is hypothetical and is not a guarantee of future performance. The returns set forth herein do not constitute a forecast; rather they are indicative of the StepStone internal transaction analysis regarding outcome potentials. Any returns set forth herein are based on the belief about the returns that may be achievable on investments that it intends to pursue. Such returns are based on the StepStone current view in relation to future events and financial performance of potential investments and various models, estimations and “base case” assumptions made by StepStone, including estimations and assumptions about events that have not occurred. Actual events and conditions may differ materially from the assumptions used to establish returns and there is no guarantee that the assumptions will be applicable to the investments. Refer to the appendix for graphical summaries of the analysis.↩︎
  8. This observation holds for the other measures as well. A 1σ increase in SBO was roughly equivalent to a 1.1σ increase in brand-name Direct Alpha and a 1.2σ increase in brand-name KS-PME.↩︎

About the Author

Marc J. Sharpe is the founder and Chairman of TFOA, an organization formed in 2007 to provide a forum for education and networking and to serve as a resource for single family office principals and professionals to share ideas and best practices, pool buying power, leverage talent and conduct due diligence. Mr. Sharpe is active in the community and has served on the Board of the Holocaust Museum Houston, the HBS Houston Angels, and on the Investment Committee for two Texas based foundations. Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members, and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families: www.tfoa.info

 

Disclosures

TFOA is a peer network of Single Family Offices. Our community is intended to provide members with educational information and a forum in which to exchange information of mutual interest. TFOA does not participate in the offer, sale or distribution of any securities nor does it provide investment advice. Further, TFOA does not provide tax, legal or financial advice. Materials distributed by TFOA are provided for informational purposes only and shall not be construed to be a recommendation to buy or sell securities or a recommendation to retain the services of any investment adviser or other professional adviser. The identification or listing of products, services, links, or other information does not constitute or imply any warranty, endorsement, guaranty, sponsorship, affiliation, or recommendation by TFOA. Any investment decisions you may make based on any information provided by TFOA is your sole responsibility. The TFOA logo and all related product and service names, designs, and slogans are the trademarks or service marks of The Texas Family Office Association. All other product and service marks on materials provided by TFOA are the trademarks of their respective owners. All of the intellectual property rights of TFOA or its contributors remain the property of TFOA or such contributor, as the case may be, such rights may be protected by United States and international laws and none of such rights are transferred to you as a result of such material appearing on the TFOA web site. The information presented by TFOA has been obtained by TFOA from sources it believes are reliable. However, TFOA does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any such information. All such information has been prepared and provided solely for general informational purposes and is not intended as user specific advice.

This document is for information purposes only and has been compiled with publicly available information. StepStone makes no guarantees of the accuracy of the information provided. This information is for the use of StepStone’s clients and contacts only. This report is only provided for informational purposes. This report may include information that is based, in part or in full, on assumptions, models and/or other analysis (not all of which may be described herein). StepStone makes no representation or warranty as to the reasonableness of such assumptions, models or analysis or the conclusions drawn. Any opinions expressed herein are current opinions as of the date hereof and are subject to change at any time. StepStone is not intending to provide investment, tax or other advice to you or any other party, and no information in this document is to be relied upon for the purpose of making or communicating investments or other decisions. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed in this report constitutes a solicitation, an offer, or a recommendation to buy, sell or dispose of any investment, to engage in any other transaction or to provide any investment advice or service.

Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Actual results may vary.

On September 20, 2021, StepStone Group Inc. acquired Greenspring Associates, Inc. (“Greenspring”). Upon the completion of this acquisition, the management agreement of each Greenspring vehicle was assigned to StepStone Group LP. Each of StepStone Group LP, StepStone Group Real Assets LP, StepStone Group Real Estate LP and StepStone Group Private Wealth LLC is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). StepStone Group Europe LLP is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, firm reference number 551580. StepStone Group Europe Alternative Investments Limited (“SGEAIL”) is an SEC Registered Investment Advisor and an Alternative Investment Fund Manager authorized by the Central Bank of Ireland and Swiss Capital Alternative Investments AG (“SCAI”) is an SEC Exempt Reporting Adviser and is licensed in Switzerland as an Asset Manager for Collective Investment Schemes by the Swiss Financial Markets Authority FINMA. Such registrations do not imply a certain level of skill or training and no inference to the contrary should be made.

In relation to Switzerland only, this document may qualify as “advertising” in terms of Art. 68 of the Swiss Financial Services Act (FinSA). To the extent that financial instruments mentioned herein are offered to investors by SCAI, the prospectus/offering document and key information document (if applicable) of such financial instrument(s) can be obtained free of charge from SCAI or from the GP or investment manager of the relevant collective investment scheme(s). Further information about SCAI is available in the SCAI Information Booklet which is available from SCAI free of charge. Manager references herein are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute investment recommendations.

The Renaissance of Energy

Over the past fifteen years, the energy industry has experienced significant challenges, which yield compelling opportunities today…

The Global Financial Crisis triggered a flood of capital into the market, ultimately hurting the returns on capital for energy investments due to their long-lived, capital-intensive nature. Over time, the shortcomings of spending on high-decline shale were seen and Returns on Invested Capital (ROIC) fell by nearly 2000 bps (20%) over the 2006-2019 period. As ROIC dwindled, mainstream investors retreated, further deepening the challenges by 2020.

Source: Third Gear Investments, Factset

As ROIC fell, generalist investors shunned energy companies, and these capital-intensive businesses could not secure development capital.1 Over time, the fiscal situation worsened, investor apathy increased, and in 2020, capital disappeared; this forced additional bankruptcies, dividend cuts, and significant layoffs to self-fund ongoing operations.

However, the industry shifted its focus, prioritizing returns over asset growth, leading to a “Renaissance of Energy.” Despite these positive changes, many outside the sector remained oblivious. But the numbers speak for themselves. The industry is now making steady progress, and the increasing Free Cash Flow (FCF) to energy is undeniable evidence of this evolution.

Source: Third Gear Investments, Bloomberg

Efficiency, Optimization, and Technology

Contrary to popular belief, OPEC’s decision to increase production in 2014 was not targeted at U.S. shale but at large investment programs that required high commodity prices ($100/bbl+) to justify their significant capital investment and long gestation periods (5-7+ years to first production). OPEC’s strategy led to financial strains across all energy sub-sectors as investment was slashed in every vertical. However, this gave rise to a new era focused on capital discipline and resource optimization (i.e., inventory management and cost efficiency).

In 2020, there was a further reallocation of capital towards renewable electrification as many investors left traditional energy for more compelling narratives around renewables; clearly, a material change in behavior was underway.

However, what hasn’t changed is the notion that investors should embrace (and prioritize) companies generating tangible free cash flows, especially with rising capital costs and inflationary pressures, to earn a positive return on their investment. Investors should also recognize that traditional hydrocarbon producers contribute significantly to developing emerging technologies due to their financial strength, engineering expertise, and asset mix, allowing for commerciality and scalability assessments.

These alternative energy investments are in addition to traditional energy companies enabling global economic growth as they maintain investment in the fuels that power 93% of electricity demand today while working to improve (reduce) their carbon emissions. Hydrocarbon companies have traditionally focused on asset growth, but now they are increasingly prioritizing improved returns; efficiency and technology are potential ways to improve the company’s margins and environmental footprint simultaneously.

For example, heat loss accounts for approximately 25% of the lost energy supply, making resource optimization a top priority for industry (and the global economy). New technologies are promising, but old technologies are still the easiest path to improved energy supply and a lower carbon footprint. The hydrocarbon industry is investing more in resource optimization, which will help to maintain and enhance hydrocarbon supply. That said, demand continues to rise, with OPEC forecasting 105.2 MMBD in Q4 2024 (up 3% from the current 102 MMBD) and 110 MMBD in 2030; and supply growth will be challenged to meet this demand over the next 5-7 years due to insufficient investment. As such, we also need new sources of incremental electricity supply to support future demand needs. Therefore, the energy renaissance is an exciting time for industry, and we all hope for a cleaner, more efficient energy future.

The world will unlikely abandon any source of hydrocarbons for electric power generation for decades; this is an evolution of energy, not a transition from hydrocarbons. It is essential to appreciate this narrative because as energy consumption per person grows, it is not being met with improved efficiency elsewhere. Therefore, while the percentage growth rate of a specific energy source may slow, it is still growing on an absolute basis. Javon’s Paradox supports the narrative: efficiency enables one to use more of what they have, not to use less due to efficiency gains.

Hydrocarbons are the building blocks of consumer society, and nearly 60% of global end-use products have no alternative to hydrocarbons. Natural gas, propane, ethane, and butane demand is expected to grow approximately 5% annually over the next decade. With ~1.2 billion people entering the middle class by 2030 and nearly 3 billion in energy poverty, demand for all energy sources will continue to grow.

Source: Enterprise Products

Renewables will not ‘democratize’ energy overnight, as the power sector has struggled with integrating intermittent forms of electricity. Therefore, the global market will continue to rely on natural gas, coal, and nuclear to accommodate imbalances from weather seasonality.

Source: IEA, World Bank, Third Gear Investments

Energy security, reliability, and affordability are fundamental rights for the global population; they drive points 1-3 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In the IEA (International Energy Agency) Outlook of December 2022, 775 million people globally lack access to electricity, equivalent to the populations of the US and EU. This number is expected to increase through 2025, primarily in Africa and Oceania, where population growth is highest.2

Source: IEA, World Bank, Enterprise Products

By 2050, Asia and Africa will comprise 80% of the global population, while North America and Europe will only represent 11.7%. Incremental energy demand will come from these regions rather than the US and Europe.

Source: All data per World Bank, 2012, Data illustration per Grace Newton, Department of Geography, University of Illinois, 2016

Global energy consumption has nearly tripled since 1971, from 230 EJ to 608 EJ in 2019. Coal demand saw its market share go from 26.1% to 26.8%; in absolute terms, coal generated 60 EJ of power in 1971 and nearly 162 EJ in 2019 – more than triple.

When one contemplates the future of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, to paraphrase Mark Twain: “It seems as though the tale of [their] demise is greatly exaggerated.” Unfortunately, energy investment in these hydrocarbons has fallen significantly, with current global upstream capex at less than half the levels of 2012-2014 (while crude oil prices are at the same levels), and with no signs of increases ahead, capital discipline is the new mantra in the oil patch and returns on invested capital are rising.

Source: Third Gear Investments, Bloomberg, RBC

Fortunately, global markets have become increasingly comfortable with natural gas as a transition fuel. Still, propane, butane, ethane, and crude oil will also play an essential part in improving the energy security, affordability, and reliability of global electricity demand and HDI (human development index) improvement. For example, the IEA forecasts that propane, butane, and ethane will see demand growth of nearly 5% annually through 2030. Without significant new sources of supply, prices will rise, which benefits margins and delivers more free cash flow.

The growth in natural gas liquids demand is supported by the massive growth emerging from the Midland and Delaware Basins in the Permian. The US is well endowed with natural resources, and these molecules are evacuated through the US Gulf Coast midstream and export facilities. The US is now the largest exporter of NGLs globally.

Source: Grand View Research

The value of traditional energy, as viewed from the lens of public equities, is likely understated. This is especially true when considering the immense economic costs of ramping up production to satisfy current demand. Over the past decade, the global economy has been flooded with inexpensive energy — a consequence of over $500 billion in lost investor capital. However, management teams are increasingly zeroing in on enhancing their Return on Capital Employed (ROCE). This is a crucial determinant of valuation in the capital markets. Current forward estimates suggest that energy may be undervalued by approximately 35-40% compared to its peers, especially considering the ROCE. And this assessment may be conservative due to three main reasons:

  1. Supply growth is decelerating, whereas demand continues to climb.
  2. Energy companies have significantly improved their leverage ratios, leading to superior earnings quality and reduced volatility.
  3. Increasing capital discipline and industry consolidation will compel companies to maximize their existing resources.

Source: Bloomberg

The near-term future suggests a rise in hydrocarbon prices, given that supply is expected to lag demand. Inventories, when adjusted for demand, are at historic lows. Until a short while ago, OPEC was producing at its peak capacity. Many OPEC+ nations are yet to fulfill their designated quotas. Throughout 2022, Russian crude oil and other products flowed continuously into China and India. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve introduced an additional 750 MBD into the market during the same period. This was concurrent with a withdrawal of nearly two million barrels a day of demand from the market, attributed to China’s zero-COVID policy; both factors have since reversed.

The recent cut by OPEC, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, reflects strategic foresight. They recognize the peril of halting hydrocarbon investments in the US. If prices stagnate between $60-$70 for a prolonged period, it’s likely to deter producers from investing. Given the ever-increasing global demand, this would hasten the natural decline of fields and pose a more significant challenge in just a few years. With Saudi Arabia at the helm, OPEC+ isn’t merely playing the game; they’re strategizing several steps in advance.

Of critical note is India’s looming surge in demand. Although lagging behind China by approximately 15 years, India has a population of 440 million below 18. This promises a sharp spike in demand over the next decade. Yet, there are no ready resources to counterbalance this anticipated near 10% hike in global demand.

Valuation & Market Leadership: Both Are Improving

The S&P Energy composite will represent nearly 10-13% of S&P EPS in 2023-2025 but is a mere 4.8% of the S&P 500. Ten (technology) companies in the S&P 500 currently represent 34% of the total market capitalization and trade at an average 50x P/E multiple. Energy multiples have contracted over the past decade, while technology multiples have expanded significantly. A notable change of leadership is emerging.

Source: Bloomberg, Wolfe Research

Public energy equities are expected to deliver industry-leading returns on capital, which should drive multiple expansion and improve valuation. As the market adapts to the new paradigm, the outlook for all hydrocarbon prices is higher. Importantly, for the energy investor, this demand has been increasingly met by US Shale – the Permian Basin – and the US Gulf Coast. If management discipline continues, it should drive improved valuation in the equity markets, and the Renaissance of Energy will be at hand.

Source: Bloomberg, Third Gear Investments

Electrification is a cornerstone in our transition to a low-carbon economy, with every energy source holding a pivotal role in this transformation. Renewable electricity is on an impressive growth trajectory. Yet renewables account for a mere 7% of global energy consumption. The projected surge in electricity demand will dwarf the forecasted growth of renewables. Princeton University predicts a 43% increase in electricity demand in the US by 2035 – electricity demand has been flat for 20 years, but AI, Cloud Computing, and EVs are dramatically changing that.

Source: Princeton University, REPEAT Study

A modest 2% uptick in global energy demand would necessitate renewable power generation equal to roughly 30% of the existing infrastructure. Therefore, the Energy Renaissance needs to be holistic and encompassing – an “All-of-the-Above” stance. However, staying financially grounded, operationally pragmatic, and commercially realistic.

An “All-of-the-Above” Approach Should Provide Energy Stability, Reliability, and Affordability.

In conclusion, the exponential growth in global energy demand will compel the world economy to incorporate more nuclear and renewable sources while acknowledging the indispensable role of hydrocarbons. As a stable and consistent energy foundation, hydrocarbons fuel both emerging economies and the progress of developing nations. Their significance in our future energy landscape remains undeniable.

Source: EIA

Strategic investments in energy companies and new technologies, primed for scaling and commercialization, are essential to satiate this burgeoning demand. Traditional energy companies have often been in the crosshairs of environmental concerns and greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, the undervaluation they face in the market currently offers an attractive prospect for investing in these vital hydrocarbon companies as they work to improve their environmental footprint.

Notes

  1. Importantly, as shown later in the white paper, E&P companies had already begun to adopt discipline by reducing capital spending.↩︎
  2. Africa’s population is growing at approximately 2.5% per year versus Europe’s 0.06% and North America’s 0.62% (including Mexico’s).↩︎

About the Authors

Sean M. Maher is a Partner and Co-Founder of Third Gear Investments (TGI). TGI was founded in 2023 to redefine energy investment. Before founding Third Gear, Mr. Maher managed public equity portfolios for an energy boutique for fifteen years and served as a publicly traded energy company director. He began his career in energy finance at Morgan Stanley’s energy investment banking program in 1999 before covering Integrated Oils, Independent Refining, Midstream, and Integrated Natural Gas in the firm’s Equity Research division. Mr. Maher serves as Chair of the Investment Committee for the Houston Museum of Natural Science and as a Trustee for Covenant House Texas.

Marc J. Sharpe is the founder and Chairman of TFOA, an organization formed in 2007 to provide a forum for education and networking and to serve as a resource for single family office principals and professionals to share ideas and best practices, pool buying power, leverage talent and conduct due diligence. Mr. Sharpe also teaches an MBA class on “The Entrepreneurial Family Office” as an Adjunct Professor at SMU Cox School of Business: Contact: marc@tfoa.me

About TFOA

The Family Office Association (“TFOA”) is a global peer network that serves as the world’s leading single family office community. Our group is for education, networking, selective co-investment, and a resource for single family offices to share ideas, deal flow and best practices. Members are not actively marketing products or services to other members and no contact information or email lists will ever be shared. Since our founding in 2007, TFOA has led the global single family office community by delivering world-class educational content, unique networking opportunities, and exceptional thought leadership to our highly curated network of the world’s largest and wealthiest families.

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